CTC

TRENDS

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)

No. 02-18   DEC 02

## 4QFY01 and 1QFY02

CTC

TRENDS

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)

No. 02-18   DEC 02

4QFY01 and 1QFY02

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)
U. S. ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-1350

INTELLIGENCE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Host nation liaison

OBSERVATION (BDE MP): Military police (MPs) have a direct impact on successful interaction with host nation authorities.

> ***DISCUSSION:*** When effectively employed in and around the local villages, the MPs are an asset in communicating with both the local authorities as well as the local populace. Success achieved in this area often leads to information that supports the brigade's intelligence collection efforts. MP teams often target the local authorities (parish police) to assist them in conducting joint operations (checkpoints, patrols, and displaced civilian control) to ease the pressure of dealing with unruly civilians.

> ***SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:*** Contact with the local authorities should be initiated as early as possible beginning at the intermediate staging base (ISB). Prior to the initial meeting, an agenda should be determined that outlines objectives desired and information requested. This initial meeting should include the following key staff members: civil affairs, psychological operations, MPs, staff judge advocate, and S2. After initial contact is completed, MP teams should have daily contact with local authorities to continue fostering effective communication and joint cooperation. Targeting meetings help to focus/update the desired objectives.

> (TA.5.2.1.3 Collect Information on Social/Political/Economic Environment)

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), Step A: evaluate the threat

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S2s come to rotations thoroughly prepared with adequate knowledge of the threat they will face.

> ***DISCUSSION:*** Unit intelligence officers (S2s) are quite proficient at IPB. Their products are timely and support the commander and staff's operational timeline.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: S2s must continue to use all available resources to assist them in developing these products and must update them during the entire military decision-making process.

(TA.5.3.1 Evaluate Threat Information)

<u>*Needs Emphasis*</u>

<u>**TREND 1**</u>

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance and security (R&S) planning and execution

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade and battalion S2s consistently fail to plan effective operations to collect the information needed to win.

DISCUSSION: Brigades and battalions are not able to effectively integrate and synchronize all of their collection efforts into a focused collection plan. S2s rarely develop focused priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and link the PIR to the commander's decision points to guide the collection plan. Collection plans are not driven by event templates and become reactive in nature. Few missions are actually synchronized against where and when the enemy will appear on the battlefield. Consequently, collection strategies suffer from an inability to identify coverage times, lack of detailed specific intelligence requirements (SIRs), gaps in coverage, and sensor-to-shooter links (named area of interest tied to target area of interest to ensure target, location, and effect). Specific orders and requests (SORs) are not well developed, and collectors are tasked to report anything they "see." Additionally, the command and control (C^2) architecture to support the collection plan is rarely well thought out or ever clearly articulated or disseminated to all collectors. The C^2 architecture never effectively integrates redundant means of communication into the collection plan. The end result is that collection assets are not focused on collecting the key piece of information at the right time and place on the battlefield, and the activity that answers the commander's PIR is often not reported in a timely manner.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: S2s must continuously refine the PIR throughout the military decision-making process (MDMP) and the execution of an operation to assist in focusing the collection effort. The brigade S2 must consolidate the battalion R&S plans into an overall brigade collection plan to determine gaps in coverage and to ensure the executed plan provides the commander with the intelligence required to make operational decisions. The S2 must develop detailed indicators of a threat or threat courses of action to guide the collection effort. The staff as a whole must plan C^2 architecture and reporting criteria to support the collection plan and clearly and accurately disseminate it to subordinate units. The time for identifying and synchronizing the C^2 architecture and reporting criteria is during the war gaming phase of the MDMP. If a separate R&S rehearsal is not conducted, responsibility for

notional area of interest (NAI) coverage needs to be integrated into the combined arms rehearsal.

<div align="right">(TA.5.2.1.1 Collect Threat Information)</div>

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Early reconnaissance

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Aviation cavalry and attack assets are not being used for early reconnaissance of objectives.

> *DISCUSSION:* Many times the player unit does not want to these assets because it may "tip their hands." This lack of reconnaissance leads directly to poor planning and sometimes to mission failure.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Allowing the aircraft to conduct an aggressive counter reconnaissance fight early (at least 48 hours out) and getting eyes on critical landing zones and alternate landing zones will increase the chance of a successful mission.

<div align="right">(TA.5.2.1.1 Collect Threat Information)</div>

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Direction finding (DF) operations

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): The company leadership usually places little emphasis on direction finding operations.

> *DISCUSSION:* This lack of emphasis is due principally to a lack of confidence in the direction finding equipment. As a result, many times there is no DF flash net and no tenable baseline. Ultimately, communications and jamming (C&J) platoons are unable to answer the brigade commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and often hinder the brigade S2's ability to see the enemy.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* When conducting electronic warfare operations on a non-linear battlefield, it is imperative that we not only intercept the enemy communications, but that we also locate the enemy to assist maneuver commanders in economizing those forces in order to neutralize the located targets. Review **FM 34-80,** *Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, Chapter 4, and **FM 34-40-9,** *Direction Finding Operations*.

TREND 4

SUBJECT: Human intelligence (HUMINT) teams lack collection tasks or focus for collection

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): HUMINT teams often lack specific collection tasks, collection focus, or direction from their S2, officer conducting the exercise (OCE), or tactical (TAC) HUMINT operations (OPS).

> *DISCUSSION:* Unit S2s, OCEs, and/or TAC HUMINT OPS do not take the unit's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and develop specific information requirements (SIR), specific orders and requests (SOR), and specific interrogatives related to the SOR that focus HUMINT collection activities.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Focus training on PIR/SIR/SOR and interrogative development that are specific to the HUMINT team's SOR. In the absence of specific collection guidance, train HUMINT teams on the development of their own SOR and interrogatives that are based on the units PIR and the context of the friendly and enemy situation.

<div align="right">(TA.5.2.1.1 Collect Threat Information)</div>

TREND 5

SUBJECT: Aviation (AVN) collection planning, reconnaissance, and planning (R&S)

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): AVN S2s fail to plan and use the reconnaissance assets to effectively conduct operations to collect the information needed to paint the best picture of the battlefield.

> *DISCUSSION:* With the coaching of the observer/controllers (O/C's), AVN units used well-developed matrices as planning tools indicating they knew it was a tool that will support the mission. However, not one unit was able to plan and execute a successful reconnaissance plan in any phase of the rotations. Intelligence collection failures were characterized by a lack of focus, timeliness, and supervision. First, reconnaissance missions were unfocused and not linked to the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) or decision points (DP). Second, missions were initiated late, often uncoordinated, and usually not tracked by higher headquarters. Third, units did not have a system to double-check when a named area of interest (NAI) was or was not covered or could not identify gaps in the coverage. Planning is not done completely in the military decision-making process (MDMP)

because a lot of the units skip or ignore this step to speed up the operations planning. Often the operations plan is also incomplete because R&S is not being planned to a ready state.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Collection/reconnaissance planning must begin when the warning order is received so that intelligence or reconnaissance teams can initiate collection operations while the staff is conducting the MDMP. Although this is not possible during initial entry missions, early reconnaissance would allow the staff and commander to make a plan based on current intelligence, not just templated enemy situations. Commanders must strive to ensure they have a well-focused collection effort. This includes limiting the number of tasks given to collection assets, ensuring tasks are tied to PIR or DPs, and ensuring the plan uses all assets available. They must use their aircraft to conduct needed reconnaissances of the battlefield at least 48 hours ahead of main attack to give the commanders a picture of the battlefield.

(TA.5.2.1.2 Collect Threat Information)

TREND 6

SUBJECT: Artillerization of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Field artillery (FA) battalion S2s does not provide a clear and relevant battlefield visualization of the enemy threat to the battalion's leaders.

DISCUSSION: The FA S2 has particular difficulty in developing, using, and disseminating IPB products that are relevant to his target audience. S2s tend to focus only on the higher headquarters' intelligence facts and assessment and fail to translate their various feeds into useful analysis explaining specific threats as they apply to the battalion's sub-elements. Their written field artillery support products (FASP), FASP briefing, and daily intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) are usually reproductions of higher headquarters' products without analysis. Instead of being told the probable ambush locations, times, threat strengths, capabilities, and TTPs, commanders are told of a general threat of ambush. Instead of predicted mortar firing and cache areas, their probable targets, and TTPs, the S3 is told just the raw number of mortars that might be in the area of operations (AOR). Lastly, instead of providing information on specific threat forces, routes, predicted attack times, and TTPs affecting the sector, the S2 spends precious time explaining higher level threats in adjacent sectors that are already covered in the written product.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The S2 needs to ask himself the simple question, " If I am the battery commander, what specific threats are there to my position and mission, and how can I counteract the threat?" He should take these questions and apply the IPB process to determine the answers and then present the answers, with analysis using an enhanced version of the briefing/FASP formats outlined in **FM 101-5,** *Staff Organization and Operations*; **FM 34-30,** *Intelligence*

Preparation of the Battlefield; and **CALL Newsletter No. 99-11,**
Artillerization of the MDMP

The FASP should be as in-depth as possible, with priority on FA-relevant data if time is limited. The FASP Intel annex is intended as a more complete product that the commanders will scan and reference as required after the brief . While portions of the BDE Intel annex may be copied verbatim into the FASP intelligence annex (i.e. light and weather), ask the "so what" question before inserting a copied portion and ensure you link the copied portion to the battalion's operation through your analysis. The artillery intelligence tab should not be a repeat of the brigade's intelligence annex. It should:

- Outline main enemy threats to firing batteries and support elements.
- Highlight enemy's most probable and most dangerous course of action (COA)
- Discuss enemy indirect fire assets and when they can range firing elements.
- Address enemy NBC capabilities, likelihood of use, and potential targets.
- Outline the enemy air threat and targets.
- Discuss current location of enemy minefields and ambush sites.
- Present enemy's projected timelines.
- Address who controls the main supply routes (MSRs).
- Designate priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) specified by the commander.

The FASP brief is the S2's FA mission-specific briefing to the battalion's leaders that focuses on providing them the critical details they need to achieve the essential field artillery tasks (EFATS) and protect the force. It is short (no more than 10 minutes) and presented in a simple and easily understood format. The core points recommended are:

- Weather; focus on impact on FA operations in that phase
- Terrain; focus on impact on FA operations in that phase (i.e. site to crest, effects on mobility)
- Enemy situation includes:

  - Current disposition of enemy forces that directly affect EFAT execution, FA operations, and force protection. (i.e. air assault/airborne, convoy, and re-supply operations).
  - Most likely enemy maneuver COAs and how they affect EFAT execution..
  - Most dangerous enemy maneuver COAs and how they affect EFAT execution.
  - Counter-fire threat to the battalion and firing units (by type, effective range, munitions, methods of acquisition, and times for counter-fire employment).
  - Specific enemy air threat and routes affecting the FA battalion (by type, methods of delivery,

air avenues of approach, and their proximity to critical FA assets).

- Specific enemy ground threats affecting the FA battalion (by type, method, employment, and time of attack).
- Specific enemy employment of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) assets affecting the FA battalion (by type, method, location, and time of the most likely strike).
- Greatest threats to firing batteries, tactical operations center (TOC), and administrative logistics operations center (ALOC), specifically identifying to the sub-element commanders their most critical threat at current and future locations.
- Projected enemy timelines listing all critical enemy actions listed above (i.e. enemy counter-fire and NBC strikes)

(TA.5.3.4 Integrate Intelligence Information)

TREND 7

SUBJECT: Training for analysis control team (ACT) integration

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): There is a failure of the ACT to be fully integrated in a brigade S2 section; therefore, the brigade does a poor job of developing fused intelligence products of the threat picture.

DISCUSSION: The primary reasons for the failure of the ACT to assist the S2 in developing a threat picture is that the all-source analysis system (ASAS) operators are not fully able to exploit all the capabilities of the system. ASAS operators are not fully trained prior to conducting a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Home station training should emphasize radar warning system (RWS) training as well exploit the capabilities of the system.

2. The ACT should be physically integrated into the brigade S2 section. This integration can be best accomplished through field or garrison training exercises comprising the brigade S2 and the management of information control officer (MICO) and analysis control team. Review **FM 34-80-1/ST,** *Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations,* to assist in identifying the mission and functions of the ACT

(TA.5.3.4 Integrate Intelligence Information)

TREND 8

SUBJECT: Seeing the enemy

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): The S2's responsibility to provide an integrated threat picture hinges upon presenting how the enemy plans to bring all of his assets to bear on the battlefield.

> *DISCUSSION:* Presenting this picture requires the S2 to make evaluations on some enemy capabilities that lie outside his area of expertise. In order to portray how the enemy commander will integrate his battlefield operating system (BOS), the S2 must rely upon and use the expertise of the battle staff. The S2 habitually develops courses of action consisting of a simple sketch that only portrays maneuver, fire support, and air defense for the close fight. His task and purpose statement for the enemy only presents a vague, broad overview. The results are an unfocused battle staff and unfocused commanders.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* The battalion staff should review the importance of reverse BOS integration in the planning process as presented in Chapter 2, **FM 34-130, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield***. Additionally, Chapter 4, **FM 34-130**, illustrates IPB requirements for the special staff and support units. The guidelines presented delineate information that staff sections should contribute to reverse BOS integration. Using that information, the battle staff can develop a systematic method to present feedback to the S2 and allow him to develop an enemy course of action (ECOA) that integrates the enemy's entire BOS into a cohesive plan. Developing a detailed narrative on the method the enemy commander plans to employ concerning each BOS in support of his maneuver plan further enhances the focus of the commanders.

> (TA.5.3.4. Integrate Intelligence Information)

TREND 9

SUBJECT: All source analysis (ASAS) radar warning system (RWS) is not employed effectively

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): ASAS RWS is not employed effectively during any phase of Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotations.

> *DISCUSSION:* Rotational unit S2s and analysis control teams (ACT) do not effectively employ the ASAS RWS during any phase of JRTC rotations. They do not understand the capabilities and, therefore, unit leadership cannot direct subordinates on what they require from the system. Units also fail to invest the time necessary to create graphic overlays, order of battle databases, and normalization tables that are specific to the scenario at JRTC. Consequently, the intelligence

battlefield operating system (IBOS) is not able to take advantage of the automatic data basing of message traffic and the use of alarms. Units lack sufficiently trained operators to efficiently manipulate the system when a plan is put in place. When a unit is able to actually get their RWS on the tactical local area network (TACLAN), the ASAS RWS functions primarily employed are chat, email, and file transfer protocol (FTP).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Focus training on the database and message handling functions of RWS and dedicate training time for the entire brigade IBOS to utilize the RWS in a field environment using mobile subscribe equipment (MSE) TACLAN as the communications backbone. Units must develop SOPs on what they require from the system.

(TA.5.3.4 Integrate Intelligence Information)

TREND 10

SUBJECT: General support (GS) military intelligence (MI) teams lack battlefield situational awareness

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): GS MI collection assets lack awareness of the friendly and enemy battlefield situation.

DISCUSSION: GS MI units frequently fail to coordinate with maneuver unit headquarters (HQ) before conducting their missions inside their areas of operation. Teams do not understand the general friendly or enemy situation in the area of operation (AO) much less the specifics of adjacent unit locations, locations of minefields or obstacles, or the orientation of friendly weapons systems. MI units fail to coordinate forward or rearward passage of lines, casualty evacuation, or fire support. Communications are not coordinated in sufficient detail to allow the collection assets to call adjacent units to pass actionable information or force protection related information to the unit. The result is intelligence collection that is not focused on answering the unit's intelligence requirements within the context of their situation and collection assets that do not understand the enemy situation. Collection activities are uncoordinated and unsynchronized and run a high risk of chance enemy contact or fratricide. Fire support is not responsive and casualties are not evacuated in a timely manner resulting in excessive died of wounds rates.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Focus training on adjacent unit coordination, forward and rearward passage of lines coordination, and the eight troop leading procedures. Develop a five-paragraph field order that adequately addresses paragraph one in its entirety.

(TA.5.3.4 Integrate Intelligence Information)

TREND 11

SUBJECT: Integrating and synchronizing the Military Intelligence company (MICO)

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Brigade commanders are relying more heavily on unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and scout assets than MICO assets.

> *DISCUSSION:* The MICO commander and analysis control team (ACT) personnel do not develop an integrated and synchronized plan to present to the brigade commander that will provide him answers to his priority intelligence requirements (PIR). Thus brigade commanders are relying more heavily on assets that will provide a clear picture of the enemy situation such as UAV video and scout reporting. The end result is a reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan that tasks UAV and scouts heavily with little guidance or focus given to MICO assets. MICO assets are not used for redundancy, cueing, or mixing let alone as primary collectors.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* MICO commanders must be aggressively participating in the brigade's military decision-making process (MDMP) to ensure MICO assets are fully integrated into the fight. The MICO commander should brief immediately following the brigade S2 during all briefings, updates, and planning sessions. He must clearly identify the capabilities and limitations of each intelligence asset and provide recommendations on how best to utilize the system based on the overall scheme of maneuver.

> (TA.5.3.4 Integrate Intelligence Information)

TREND 12

SUBJECT: Integration of the air defense (AD) battlefield operating system (BOS) during intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) development/refinement

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Air defense officers (ADOs) at battalion (BN) and brigade (BDE) routinely have difficulty developing/refining the aerial IPB.

> *DISCUSSION:*

> 1. ADOs are challenged in articulating the enemy air threat to the maneuver commander and staff during the military decision-making process (MDMP). Without a complete threat picture, staffs are not considering the enemy's air threat and their impact on friendly operations and as a result AD fire units are haphazardly task organized with rifle companies or they are positioned in locations where they cannot effectively defeat the enemy air threat.

> 2. Air defense officers are especially challenged in contributing to the BDE/BN S2's IPB products. ADOs struggle in planning, coordinating,

and integrating the air defense battlefield operating system into the BDE/BN concept of operation. ADOs must put more effort into mission analysis and their particular staff estimate. The ADO's analysis should include analysis of the enemy air doctrinal employment tactics, capabilities, limitations, and most importantly their vulnerabilities. Integrating the ADO's analysis with the S2's IPB products significantly contributes to a linked analysis and truly articulates an integrated threat product based primarily on the enemy ground maneuver plan that essentially develops a task and purpose for the various air platforms that the enemy may employ.

3. When analyzing the enemy's air threat, the ADO must think about the enemy operating systems. How will reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) contribute to the enemy's intelligence battlefield operating system? Every enemy aerial platform will be focused on RISTA despite their task and purpose. How will enemy air contribute to the fires and maneuver battlefield operating systems? Lastly, how will enemy air contribute to the combat service support BOS? The challenge is to articulate the "so what analysis:"

- Who (type of unit and aerial platform)
- What (clear task: recon, re-supply, deliver minefields/chemical/biological attack)
- When (predictive based on pattern and linked analysis with the S2)
- Where (location or type of target -- high value target/high priority target)
- Why (purpose for the aerial platform)

4. ADOs must be trained in TTPs for seeing the enemy and have the required tools to achieve pattern and predictive analysis. The four-step IPB process is the methodology to achieve pattern, and most importantly, predicative analysis. ADOs must make the call on what enemy aerial platforms will do and how those platforms will contribute to a linked and integrated threat picture.

5. The BDE/BN commanders' mouthpiece for the intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS) is the S2. The trend is BDE/BN S2s who are only focused on the enemy's maneuver and fires OS when conducting analysis for the enemies' most probable and dangerous course of action. The ADO must aggressively contribute to arming the S2 with enemy aerial threat analysis. If the BDE/BN is not focused on the enemy's air threat, no coordinated combined arms effort will be allocated toward dealing with enemy air platforms. Without seeing the enemy, ADOs will never get integrated and synchronized at the BDE/BN level.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The ADO's ability to get the AD operating system integrated is contingent upon contributing to the development of an integrated threat picture. With the threat clearly articulated to the supported unit, the ADO can then recommend air defense priorities and a course of action to support a unit's scheme of maneuver. Based on system capabilities, the unit must then allocate sufficient combat power of the appropriate type to accomplish the

mission. The ADO must then position fire units accordingly to mass fires at targeted areas of interest (TAIs) along templated enemy air avenues of approach. ADOs should refer to **FM 34-130,** *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*, and **FM 44-100,** *US Army Air and Missile Defense Operations*, Appendix A, *Air IPB* and Appendix B, *Air Defense Planning*. Conduct leader training and situational training exercises in a time constrained environment to increase proficiency in aerial IPB and planning how the AD BOS is integrated and synchronized at battalion and brigade level.

(TA.5.3.4 Integrate Intelligence Information)

TREND 13

SUBJECT: Event templating and collection management

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): After identifying the set of potential threat courses of action (COAs), the initial challenge is to determine which one the enemy will actually adopt.

> *DISCUSSION:* The art of identifying initial collection requirements revolves around predicting specific areas and activities that, when observed, will reveal which courses of action the threat has chosen. The difference between the named area of interests (NAIs), time phase lines, and indicators associated with each COA form the basis of the event template. The event template is a guide for collection management and reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning.
>
> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* The S2 must make the effort to consistently update the event template, a tool that allows the battalion to keep its collective focus on the enemy and how he will fight. The S2 must be relentless in his pursuit of updating the event template, whether it is for a targeting meeting or to show that the threat is fighting differently than was anticipated. An inability to develop a timely, visible product leads to a less than synchronized collection plan and focus for the commanders. In order to determine the enemy COAs, the S2 must also consistently update the collection plan. See Chapter 2, **FM 34-130,** *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)*, and Chapters 2 and 3, **FM 34-2,** *Collection Management and Synchronization Planning*. These references will allow the S2 to achieve a better understanding of the processes associated with event templating and collection management, as well as essential insights into the benefits of knowing his higher headquarters' collection focus.

(TA.5.3.3.1 Develop Enemy Intentions)

TREND 14

SUBJECT: Traffic analysis teams (TAs) combat information reporting failure

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Traffic analysis teams fail to identify and report combat information in a timely manner

> *DISCUSSION:* The TAs habitually fail to report combat information in a timely manner. Lack of experience, personnel, and knowledge of the enemy/friendly situation are several contributing factors. Soldiers are untrained in sanitized reporting techniques and wait for the 100% solution before reporting the information, both of which lead to intelligence not being disseminated in a timely manner.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* The TA non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) and team must understand the techniques used to sanitize reports in order to provide more timely and accurate reports. The TA must report information to the analysis control team (ACT) to facilitate the fusion process and timely dissemination. When the TA waits for the 100% solution, it has a direct adverse effect on the ACT.

> (TA.5.4.4 Prepare Reports on Enemy)

TREND 15

SUBJECT: Information management

OBSERVATION (INTEL DIV): Information management continues to be a negative trend. Successfully operating the tactical operations center (TOC) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) continues to be a problem.

> *DISCUSSION:* Information and intelligence arriving at the various TOCs are not always getting to the S2, nor is the S2 section properly disseminating information and intelligence to other battle staff sections. S2 sections do not aggressively solicit intelligence and combat information from higher and subordinate units as well as within the TOC. Incomplete or vague reports are not pursued for additional details. Upon receiving reports, S2 sections have no tracking mechanism in place to ensure that the reports are logged, plotted, analyzed, and disseminated to higher, subordinate, and staff elements. S2 sections' battle tracking capabilities are greatly diminished because the sections do not routinely develop a standing operating procedure (SOP) or do not read the one which exists that clearly delineates individual duties and responsibilities and establishes a section battle rhythm. Consequently, the sections cannot effectively conduct current operations, battle tracking, and future operations planning.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Accurate and timely reporting can only occur if reporting standards receive command emphasis from the brigade commander down to the squad leader level. At a minimum, the standard size, activity, location, unit, time, and enemy (SALUTE) report format should be enforced as the proper reporting format. Brigade and battalion tactical standing operating procedures and the S2 section

standing operating procedures (SOPs) must refer to information management in great detail. The TACSOP should address how reports are disseminated within the TOC and also establish criteria for types of reports that require an "attention in the TOC" announcement. Any report that impacts on one of the commander's critical information requirements should result in an "attention in the TOC" announcement. The SOP must give better examples of how to record information in the journal, to include "actions taken".

(TA.5.4.4 Prepare Reports on Enemy)

MANEUVER BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

__Positive Performance__

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Unit movement formations in search and attack

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Units consistently maintain dispersed formations during the execution of search and attack operations.

> *DISCUSSION:* Commanders are utilizing their platoons to clear assigned zones and requesting "mobile assets" -- anti-tank (AT) section, attack aviation (ATK AVN), and mechanized armor -- as a finishing force of the find, fix, finish elements of movement to contact (MTC). Platoon movement formations change continually based on the terrain and on the enemy situation. Squad and team leaders are the ones executing these changing formations. This is an essential leader task because these leaders see the enemy situation and terrain first-hand and must take the initiative and adjust the formations. The platoons are able to move in dispersed wedges, clearing larger amounts of terrain in one "pass," as opposed to moving in modified files and only clearing a narrow front. Selection of better movement formations allows rotational units to cover a wider front and bring their firepower to bear more quickly upon contact.
>
> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Units should conduct leader training at company and battalion level. This training should be conducted in both classroom and field environments, and leaders, at different levels, should be required to discuss how they would conduct (formations/task organization) clearance operations.

(TA.1.1 Move)

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Mounted land navigation/movement in limited visibility

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Anti-tank companies are executing all required limited visibility movements with no mission degradation.

> *DISCUSSION:* During all phases of operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), anti-tank (AT) platoons have consistently conducted significant numbers of both on and off-road movements. Vehicle commanders routinely demonstrate proficiency in planning routes and navigating and are assisted by vehicle-powered precision lightweight global positioning receivers (PLGRs). Driver proficiency with night vision devices (NVDs) have also contributed to successful and

timely execution of complicated movements such as nighttime screen line withdrawals, both under and not under pressure, in thickly wooded terrain.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Continued emphasis on realistic, tactically based drivers' training programs is a must, particularly under limited visibility conditions. Likewise, situational training exercise (STX)-type training that forces sergeants and lieutenants to plan routes and to navigate cross-country in the dark will reinforce both their proficiency and their self-confidence.

(TA.1.1.1.2.1 Move While Mounted)

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Land navigation skills

OBSERVATION (MP DIV): Military police (MP) teams have shown a dramatic improvement in their mounted land navigation skills.

DISCUSSION: The recent improvement in land navigation, especially under blackout conditions, is a result of emphasized use of the AN/PSN-11 precision lightweight global receiver (PLGR) as a tool to enhance navigation skills. The soldier's ability to maintain and properly use the AN/PSN-11 is a positive reflection on training received while at home station.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: MP teams should continue to conduct aggressive training on the AN/PSN-11 while at home station in concert with their training on basic land navigation skills.

(TA.1.1.3 Navigate)

TREND 4

SUBJECT: Land navigation

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Stinger Teams have shown a dramatic improvement in their mounted and dismounted land navigation skills.

DISCUSSION: The recent improvement in team land navigation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) is no doubt, in part, to the fielding of the AN/PSN-11 precision lightweight global receiver (PLGR). This invaluable piece of equipment greatly enhanced the Stinger teams ability to reach their assigned positions. The soldier's ability to properly use the AN/PSN-11 is obviously due to training received at home

station. Teams receive vital instructions and realistic route and terrain orientation prior to a mission, allowing the platoons C^2 element to accurately track the team's position on the battlefield.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Continue to receive training on the AN/PSN-11 and basic land navigation fundamentals. The compass and map are the primary means of navigation. Teaching a team to navigate with these basic tools always precedes the AN/PSN-11 training. Refer to **FM 3-25.26,** *Map Reading and Land Navigation* for basic land navigation training.

(TA.1.3 Navigate)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Establish overwatch/support by fire

OBSERVATION (TF 1): Support by fire elements position according to the original plan and do not reposition based on the terrain and desired effects on the enemy

DISCUSSION: The support by fire (SBF) element in a platoon or company attack is usually given a pre-designated position based on a map reconnaissance, aerial imagery, scout sketch, or other intelligence. The SBF element leader will attempt to occupy that position; regardless of its actual utility in achieving the effects the platoon leader/commander (PL/CDR) wants. If the SBF encounters enemy fire, as it is moving into position, the SBF immediately seeks cover and doesn't move from that position for the remainder of the operation. The result is a SBF located on poor terrain with an inadequate picture of the objective, giving little support to the assault element.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: During the troop leading procedures (TLP) the PL/ CDR must give specific "success criteria" to the SBF in accordance with its task and purpose. The PL/ CDR must make it clear to the SBF element leader that he must reposition when necessary to achieve the desired effects. In a deliberate attack, the SBF is often the lead element in movement, and thus the first to emplace or make contact. The PL/ CDR can initially locate with them and then move to the assault or breach after verifying they are emplaced correctly according to his intent.

Examples:

- An infantry company is conducting a deliberate attack on a trench-bunker complex. The SBF is moving into position when it receives fire from an enemy observation post (OP). The SBF element leader executes a react to contact battle drill and then bounds his machine guns forward into position. The CDR

moves forward to identify the objective, the SBF position, and make contact with the SBF element leader to ensure they have a common understanding of the effects to be desired. He can bring his assault element leader with him. The CDR says, "We are going to breach on the left by Bunker #4. Suppress the trench to prevent enemy from repositioning against the breach. After we breach the wire, you have to be prepared to move forward so you have a better view of the rest of the trench."

- An infantry platoon is conducting a movement to contact. While moving in traveling overwatch they receive machine-gun fire from the front. The PL decides to conduct a platoon attack. He does a hasty terrain analysis and decides to move his assault element to the right. He issues a warning order to the assault element and then moves forward to the SBF position to ensure they are properly emplaced with the ability to suppress the objective. He also confirms with the weapons' squad leader that he knows where the assault will be moving so he can adjust fires accordingly. Once this is complete, he can then move to the assault element to control actions on the objective.

(TA.1.1.4 Close into Tactical Position)

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Deteriorating land navigation skills

OBSERVATION (LF DIV): Land navigation skills are slowly deteriorating due to the use of global positions systems (GPS) and poor training on map and compass.

DISCUSSION: The flood of GPS in units has caused them to lose the traditional skills of using a map and compass. These skills are perishable. Units are often challenged to get from point A to point B, even though they can always tell you their location. Units spend too much time trying to get from one point to another. Many leaders have demonstrated an inability to terrain associate using the standard 1:50,000 maps. As a result, units frequently do not take terrain into consideration when selecting movement routes.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Land navigation training needs to focus on the basics of land navigation -- use of the compass and reading a map. Terrain association needs to be stressed in order for leaders to take advantage of terrain during the fight. GPS is a tool to confirm land navigation not a replacement for a map or compass.

(TA.1.1.3 Navigate)

TREND 3

SUBJECT: React to contact

OBSERVATION (LF DIV): Squads are not able to react to contact when it differs from their rehearsals.

> *DISCUSSION:* Squads rehearse the battle drill react to contact prior to mission execution, but when they receive contact on unfamiliar terrain or from a direction other than the one they rehearsed, they are not able to react. Typically, one element in the unit receives contact and soldiers wait until receiving a command from their squad or team leader before seeking cover. When in a covered position, soldiers have difficulty identifying the source of the enemy fire and thus do not return fire. The platoon leader, armed with inaccurate information, attempts to react as quickly as possible without developing the situation.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* The unit in contact must seek cover and return well-aimed fire as quickly as possible. The squad leader should issue immediate directions to his team leaders. Fire team leaders should immediately bring their team on line to maximize fire in a particular direction. While the team leaders are moving into position and placing fire on the enemy, the squad leader should report the situation to the platoon leader so he can decide if he is going to commit the remainder of the platoon.

> **Examples:**

> - The squad is the lead element of a platoon moving in traveling overwatch with squads in column. The unit receives direct fire from the front. Every soldier immediately takes cover while the lead team leader reports the direction and distance to the squad leader. The squad leader, judging the enemy to be located directly in front of him, orders both team leaders to put their teams on line, orienting their fires to the front. The squad leader then reports to the platoon leader the distance, direction, and size of the enemy (based on the volume of fire being received).
> - The squad is the lead element of a platoon moving in a traveling overwatch with squads in column. The trail fire team receives direct fire from the right. Every soldier immediately takes cover while the team leader reports the direction and distance to the squad leader. The squad leader, knowing he is receiving fire from his right, but concerned the enemy may try to move around his front, orders the team in contact to maintain fire in the direction of the enemy (right) while the other team orients to the front. By the time the squad leader has issued his instructions, both teams are on line and only some minor repositioning is required in the lead team. The squad leader then reports to the platoon leader the distance, direction, and size of the enemy (based on the volume of fire being received).

> (TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 4

SUBJECT: Fixing the enemy during movement to contact

OBSERVATION (TF 2): The responsibility of fixing an enemy force is conducted only at platoon level.

> *DISCUSSION:* One of the hardest tasks to accomplish at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) is fixing an enemy force long enough to complete its eventual destruction. A common trend is for the battalion, as well as the company, to leave this task to a platoon. The strength of the opposing force (OPFOR) is his ability to freely move around the battlefield. Even though a platoon has the ability to fix an enemy force, there are several other assets at battalion and company level that can greatly assist in this task.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Assign blocking tasks to other elements within the company to fix enemy forces in a given company or platoon zone. Assign the mechanized platoon priority targets. It is essential to get machine guns (crew drills) into the fight as soon as possible. Assets available at higher headquarters that a company can request to aid as a blocking force include: anti-armor, attack helicopters, and priority of fires from artillery or mortar assets.

> **Example:** A company is given the mission to clear a designated zone during a movement to contact. Prior to beginning the operation, the company commander conducts an intelligence preparation of the battlefield or the zone and templates an enemy squad in the center of his zone. The commander requests an anti-tank section, an observation helicopter (OH)-58D section, and priority of 120mm fires to assist his unit in fixing the templated enemy. The commander also sends a platoon to the far side of the templated enemy to establish a blocking position. He then maneuvers his main effort platoon to find the enemy (with the task to clear) and keeps his remaining platoon in a follow-and-support role. Upon making contact with the enemy, he is now in a position to find, fix, and finish while maximizing the use of combined arms.

> (TA.1.2 Engage Enemy)

TREND 5

SUBJECT: Controlling the rate and distribution of fire.

OBSERVATION (LF DIV): Leaders at the platoon, squad, and team level frequently do not develop or execute a direct fire plan that maximizes their firepower advantage at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).

> *DISCUSSION:* Leaders at the platoon, squad, and platoon level

frequently do not understand their role in controlling the direct fires of their elements and do not develop an adequate fire plan for operations. Leaders do not designate adequate sectors of fire, issue fire commands, or designate the rate of fire for engagements. When making contact, team leaders do not control their teams' fires by leading by example and soldiers shoot at whatever they choose with the rate of fire of their choice.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Home station training should have a focus on rate and distribution of fire drills at the platoon level and lower. Units must develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) that allow for positive control with minimal explanation. Every squad and team must have an SOP that addresses these requirements. The standard for controlling the rate and distribution of fire is clearly laid out in **FM 7-8,** *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*.

Example.

- Fire Commands. Should include: warning, limits/sectors, target designation, rate of fire, and movement commands/codes
- Warning. Alerts the squad, team, or individuals of a new fire command. The leader uses the numerical designation of the element to alert soldiers to the coming commands

Example.

- To alert the squad, the squad leader will call out 2-2, 3-2, etc. To alert a fire team, he would call Alpha or Bravo.
- Limits and sector commands establish squad and team sectors for both observation and/or fire. They are also used to shift fires when needed. The squad leader always assigns sectors from left to right. He will mark left limit, center sector, and right limit by either pointing them out or using laser (night) or tracer (day). After marking these sectors, the squad leader waits for a response of "identified" from each element before he goes on to the next sector. If the sector cannot be identified, the leader must mark it again. Normally, the sector of fire from the left limit to the center of sector is designated for the fire team on the left. The sector from the center to the right limit is for the team on the right. Both teams must identify the entire sector from left to right in case they have to take over the whole squad sector of fire.
  - **Example.**

    Leader: "2-2 left limit"

    Soldiers: "left limit"

    Leader: marks with laser or tracers

    Soldiers: "identified"

Leader: "center"

        Soldiers: "center"

Leader: marks with laser / tracers

        Soldiers: "identified"

Leader: "right limit"

        Soldiers: "right limit"

Leader: marks with laser / tracers

        Soldier: "mark it again"

Leader: "right limit"

        Soldiers: "right limit"

Leader: marks again, using alternate means if required

        Soldiers: "identified"

- Target Designation. Squad leader uses this to designate specific targets to the squad, teams or individuals. It also allows the squad or single team to mass its fire on a high threat target such as a crew served weapon or bunker. The leader may also use this to change sector of fire responsibilities. This command can take either of two forms:
- "In your sector." Tells soldiers they will be firing within their assigned sectors at known, likely, or suspected enemy positions. All targets are engaged in this order of priority. The command may be altered ("In squad sector") so a fire team can suppress the entire squad sector while the other team is doing something else.
- "On my laser / tracer." Allows the leader to mass fires of key weapons or elements on high threat targets. Leader should adjust the command to fit the means of marking.
  - **Example 1:**

    Leader: "Alpha, on my laser, rapid!

            Soldiers: "Alpha, on laser, rapid

    Leader: Fires laser 3 times at desired target

Soldiers: "identified"

Leader: "fire!"

- **Example 2:**

    Leader: "2-2, on my flare, rapid!"

    Soldiers: "2-2, on flare,
    rapid"

    Leader: "has M203 gunner fired an
    illumination round at desired target?"

    Soldiers: "identified"

    Leader: "fire!"

(Note: Illumination should be shot on ground directly
behind the target.)

- Rates of fire. This command is given immediately after the
  target designation has been established. The rate of fire can
  also be changed at any time using this set of commands:
- Rapid fire. Used to order the maximum amount of controlled
  fire. Rapid fire is when all soldiers engage known targets at the
  highest rate of fire possible while still employing marksmanship
  fundamentals and taking well aimed shots. It is also used for
  immediate suppression of sectors of fire to gain fire superiority.
- Sustained fire: This command roughly cuts rapid rate in half. It
  is well-aimed shots directed at known, likely and suspected
  targets. For M4s, it is a shot every 4-5 seconds. For semi-
  automatic weapons (SAWs), it is a burst every 5-6 seconds.
- Watch and shoot. This command orders the lowest rate of fire. It
  is about half the rate of fire of sustained. It is extremely well
  aimed shots at known targets when they present themselves. It
  is used when there is no returning enemy fire or when ammo is
  becoming critical.
- Stop. This command is used to reduce the rate of fire without
  actually lifting fire. It is also used to alert the element that a new
  command is coming. When given, soldiers drop to the watch
  and shoot mode and await the next command.
- Lift fire. Given when the situation no longer calls for firing. It is
  also used when fires or their effects may hit other soldiers (i.e.
  during an assault).
    - **Example:** (Sectors have already been
      designated)

        Leader: "2-2, in your sector, rapid!"
        (Squad is in contact; battle drill 2 has
        been executed)

Soldiers: "In sector,
rapid"

Leader: "fire"

Leader: "stop" (squad has gained fire
superiority)

Soldiers: "stop"

Leader: "sustained"

Soldiers: "sustained"

Leader: "stop" (leader acquires high
threat target)

Soldiers: "stop"

Leader: "Alpha, on my tracer, rapid!"

Soldiers: "Alpha, on
tracer, rapid"

Leader: fires 3 tracers at bunker

Soldiers: "identified"

Leader: "fire!" (A Tm picks up rapid rate
of fire on designated target)

Leader: "stop" (bunker destroyed, no
return fire)

Soldiers: "stop"

Leader: "lift, fire, lift fire"

Soldiers: "lift fire"

- Movement commands and code words. Tells squads and teams
  when to move, the direction to move, and what technique they
  will use. These commands and codes are designed to simplify
  orders into short, concise, and understandable commands.
  - Codes: Used because most enemies we will
    face will likely understand simple English terms
    / phrases.
  - Red: right, to the right, right side of
  - Blue: left, to the left, left side of
  - Green: grenade has been employed/fired. Stop
    and seek cover.

- Movement commands. Designed to allow leaders to order a movement with a simple verbal command. These should be backed us by hand /arm signals.
- Slide: Used to get a trailing team to move on line with or adjacent to a forward team. Also used to adjust direction of movement (i.e. to get entire squad centered on an objective during fire and movement). The direction of movement stays the same, but the element shifts to the right or left to center itself.
- Sweep: Used to order a team or squad to conduct a flanking movement.
    - **Examples:**

    Leader: "Alpha, sweep blue" (A Team flank left)

    Tm Leader: "Alpha, sweep blue"

    Leader: "Bravo, slide red": (B Tm shift right/move on line to A Team's right)

    Tm Leader: "Bravo, slide red"

    (TA.1.2.1 Engage Enemy)

FIRE SUPPORT BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1

SUBJECT: React to direct fire contact

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Units continue to react quickly to direct fire contacts.

> *DISCUSSION:* Rifle platoons and squads are executing this battle drill in accordance with published standards. Lead fire teams are returning fire as they are seeking cover as opposed to waiting several seconds or even minutes. Size, activity, location, unit, time, and enemy (SALUTE) reports are then sent rapidly, giving the squad and platoon leaders the information required to make tactical decisions. Rapid execution of battle drill 2 prevents the opposing force (OPFOR) from effectively engaging friendly units with direct fires and enables friendly units to seize the initiative.

> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Units must continue to stress the importance of reacting to enemy fire with an overwhelming amount of return fire. The most important training for any maneuver element at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) is this battle drill. Units should continue to conduct situational training exercise (STX) lanes stressing react to contact. This type of lane produces maximum training effects while requiring limited resources (land, OPFOR, and class V).

(TA.2.2 Engage Ground Targets)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1

SUBJECT: 6400-mil operations/out of traverse fire missions

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Firing batteries fail to provide responsive, accurate, massing fires during 6400-mil operations

> *DISCUSSION:* Units are not proficient in using alternate aiming reference points. In many cases, units are not using distant aiming points (DAP) although available. Gunners and section chiefs are not proficient at using aiming posts to pick up displacement. Additionally, howitzer sections do not emplace their aiming posts correctly, resulting in inadequate aiming references for all possible azimuths. The section chief and gunner are frequently unaware of what aiming reference points to use when the mission is announced. Sections cannot traverse

the howitzer 6400-mils within the howitzer position because they have selected or prepared their firing platform incorrectly. M119 firing platforms must be a 15-meter diameter circle clear of all obstructions. The most common problems are collimators, berm, or individual fighting positions that obstruct the howitzer's ability to traverse a full 6400-mils. Gun direction units (GDU) must have enough slack in the wire to the data display unit (DDU) to allow the howitzer to traverse 6400-mils. Additionally, cant is often a problem on alternate azimuths of fire because the chief and the battery leadership have not taken the time to verify each howitzer sections' cant. Battery executive officers (XO), chiefs of firing battery (CFB), and gunnery sergeants (GSG) do not compute minimum quadrant elevation (QE) for the full 6400-mils. Sections are not able to fire because of a camouflage net, section vehicles, OE-254 antenna, or some other obstruction. The XO/CFG/GSG fail to take each section's site-to-crest for each octant and determine the minimum QE for each. Fire direction centers (FDCs) fail to compute terrain gun position corrections (TGPCs) for each octant. When GDUs fail, FDCs are forced to read individual piece data, increasing both mission time and the probability of a firing error. Howitzer sections must consume significant time conducting out of traverse missions because they are not oriented in the correct direction to support the current tactical fight. Batteries designated as having a quick-fire channel or as the battalion's primary counter fire battery are often not oriented on an azimuth that coincides with their designation (i.e., the counter-fire battery is oriented on an 'old' azimuth 2500 mils out from the radar's current search azimuth). The out-of-traverse missions caused by these disconnects require significantly more time to fire and usually cause the unit to fail to achieve the desired effects of their fires.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. Ensure howitzer sections are trained on alternate aiming reference points and on how to position their aiming poles to facilitate 6400-mil operations. In lieu of DAPs, howitzer sections must emplace sufficient aiming references to accomplish the mission.

2. During leader checks of a howitzer section, the "big 3" (XO/CFB/GSG) should verify that the howitzer section can traverse 6400-mils and that the section can pick up an aiming reference point in each octant.

3. Battery XOs, CFBs and GSGs must take the section chief's site-to-crest for each octant and determine the minimum QE for each gun in each octant. The FDO must then determine which guns are available for low angle fire missions in each octant. The fire direction officer (FDO) should then consider formulating a quick reference pie chart that lists unavailable guns for each octant and notify the battalion FDC of his findings. The battery FDC will then be able to quickly call a section out of action and increase the volume of fire.

4. The FDO and FDC should compute TGPCs for all eight octants, initially focusing on octants of the highest priority, as designated by the battalion (BN) S3. Consider computing TGPCs for both low and high

angle. Read and review **FM 6-40,** *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery*, Chapter 12.

5. The battery should provide orientation recommendations to battalion when they are experiencing increased out of traverse missions. This would increase responsiveness of fires for the task force. The BN FDO manages and performs tactical fire direction, ensuring the fire support coordinator's intent with fires is achieved.

6. Rehearse out-of-traverse dry-fire missions in each octant as frequently as possible to ensure the firing unit is capable of providing responsive, accurate, and massed fires. This will eliminate the problems associated with aiming reference points, 6400-mil traverse, and minimum QE. The battery leadership should supervise all dry-fire missions to ensure that sections are not merely "finger-drilling" the exercise and to assist in troubleshooting any problems that arise.

7. Read and adhere to procedures outlined in the article entitled: 6400-mil *Operations: Timely Fires in All Directions*, featured in the May-June 1999.

(TA.2.2 Engage Ground Targets)

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Quick fire planning

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Company fire support elements and platoon forward observers routinely fail to develop quick fire plans for their company and platoon assembly areas.

DISCUSSION: When the company receives enemy contact there is no responsive or effective indirect fire support. The company mortars are not given targets to lay on in order to suppress or repel an enemy attack while moving along a designated route.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The fire support officer/fire support non-commissioned officer (FSO/FSNCO) must be in constant contact with the company commander and must be aware of the company timeline.

2. While in a company assembly area the FSO/FSNCO must know how long the unit will occupy the current position. Taking into consideration the assets available, the FSO will immediately plan fires that will support the company assembly area.

3. The company is most vulnerable to enemy attack during the initial occupation of the assembly area. The FSO should plan based on enemy avenues of approach, taking into consideration the location of

adjacent units in order to provide accurate responsive fires that will facilitate the occupation of the company assembly area.

4. Once the FSO has established an initial quick fire plan for the company, he will pass these targets to the company mortar section and insure that the mortar section is targeted on the most likely avenue of enemy approach. The FSO/FSNCO will ensure that the planned targets have both a primary and alternate observer.

5. After the company commander has established the platoon positions and the company perimeter, the FSO can refine his targets and construct a more in-depth company fire support plan.

6. While conducting a company movement along a specified route the FSO/FSNCO must be prepared to construct a quick fire plan to support the company whenever the company has halted.

7. SOPs must be established to allow the company fire support team to be an effective asset to the company. The following duties and responsibilities must be addressed:

- Who is responsible for tracking adjacent units during the movement?
- Who is responsible for establishing the targets?
- Who is responsible for positioning the company mortar section and ensuring that they have received the targets?
- Who is responsible for clearance of fires in the current location?
- Where is the 60mm mortar ammo and who is responsible for getting the ammo to the mortars?

8. Once a battle drill for the company has been established and everyone is aware of their responsibilities, the company fire support element can rapidly isolate, block, or defeat enemy forces upon contact.

(TA.2.3 Integrate Fire Support)

AIR DEFENSE BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Stinger team engagement procedures

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Stinger teams are using proper engagement procedures when tracking and firing on enemy aircraft.

> *DISCUSSION:* Engagement procedures with the Stinger weapon system are very basic skills for our branch. In the past, Stinger teams failed to fully utilize the proper engagement procedures when firing on enemy aircraft. Stinger teams must translate the skills they learn on the Stinger troop proficiency trainer (STPT) and the improved moving target simulator (IMTS) into the combat skills they need at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).
>
> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Continue the use of the STPT and IMTS facilities so that the teams will understand the correct procedures when firing the Stinger weapon system. Ensure Stinger teams understand how repetitive training on drills at home station make target engagement a second nature process in a combat environment. Making training as realistic as possible during home station training will set the conditions for success in combat. Refer to **ARTEP 44-117-11, *Drills For The Stinger Team***.
>
> (TA.3.1.2.1 Determine System Capability for Engaging Air Targets)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Dissemination of early warning to the supported unit

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): Air defense officers (ADOs) at the brigade (BDE) and battalion (BN) tactical operations center (TOC) dissemination of directed early warning is intermittent.

> *DISCUSSION:* ADOs have difficulty establishing a battle drill of early warning dissemination in BDE and BN TOCs. Many times the air defense artillery (ADA) cells in BDE/BN TOCs have difficulty in providing directed early warning of imminent threat aircraft to their supported units. Lack of directed early warning results in minimal passive and active measures taken against enemy aircraft by non-air

defense units.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Establish TOC battle drills to disseminate early warning to the supported unit. TOC RTOs, normally a non-air defender, must familiarize themselves with the "dynamite drill." (See technique outlined below.) The ADO must rehearse enemy air battle drills with the various TOC radiotelephone operators (RTOs), battle captains, staff sergeant majors (SGMs), and the entire TOC crew before an actual enemy aircraft enters the supported units AO. Address early warning issues and procedures during the supported unit's military decision-making process (MDMP). Include the early warning plan in the supported unit operation orders (OPORDs) and address active and passive air defense measures during rehearsals. ADOs should refer to **FM 44-100, *US Army Air and Missile Defense Operations***, Chapter 3 and **FM 44-44, *Avenger Platoon, Section, and Squad Operations***, Appendix B (Combined Arms for Air Defense).

A Technique: The air defense warning/weapon control status (ADW/WCS) has been upgraded to red/tight. The ADO monitors the division early warning (DEW) net and conducts track correlation with his digital early warning means and once he determines the threat aircraft is within his area of interest (crossed the dynamite line) announces "dynamite." The ADO then tracks the aircraft on his map board while the ADA RTO makes a written track log record of the hostile track by monitoring the DEW net/digital EW means and conducts redundant EW broadcast over the ADA battery or platoon nets. The maneuver RTO will broadcast the track data "dynamite calls" over the maneuver command net as they are announced in the TOC by the ADO. Force protection measures include the following: all personnel within the TOC don their ballistic helmets, selected personnel man crew-served weapons, personnel occupy survival positions and trenches, vehicles in convoy herringbone vehicles and alert their air guards, and all soldiers of the supported unit have been trained in passive AD measures. Refer to **FM 44-64, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Sensor Platoon***, Figure C-3 for a sample early warning scenario.

(TA.3.1.1 Select Air Targets to Attack)

MOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

__Positive Performance__

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Combined arms breaches in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT)

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Units consistently conduct combined arms breaches during the attack (MOUT).

> *DISCUSSION:* During the clearance of buildings within a MOUT environment, units often encounter mine/wire obstacles. These obstacles prevent the dismounted infantry from easily moving from building to building. The drill of breaching obstacles is the same whether the obstacle is located within the city or outside the city. The fundamentals of suppress, obscure, secure, and reduce (SOSR) are being applied. The infantry platoons are requesting indirect smoke and are using hand-held smoke in order to obscure the breach site. The anti-tank/heavy teams are being incorporated into suppressing the enemy as engineer elements with maneuver squads secure the site and reduce the obstacle.

> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Units should continue to understand the complexity of breaching obstacles within a MOUT environment and continue to task organize forces that are able to gain freedom of movement as they progress from building to building.

> (TA.6.1.1.1 Breach Obstacles)

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Temporary route signing

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Military police (MP) platoons effectively employ temporary route signing.

> *DISCUSSION:* Well planned and efficiently executed temporary route signing missions assist the brigade exponentially in the movement of its rolling stock as well as free-up limited MP assets from conducting unnecessary special circulation control measures.

> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* At a minimum. a detailed terrain analysis and map reconnaissance should be conducted to effectively plan for temporary route signing. Signs should be constructed and employed in accordance with **FM 19-4,** *__Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, and Enemy Prisoner__*

of War Operations. Conducting rehearsals by actually laying out the signs on a terrain model is a highly recommended procedure to ensure a successful operation.

<div align="right">(TA.6.1.2.3 Facilitate Movement on Routes)</div>

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Convoy escorts

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Military police (MP) squads continue to demonstrate proficiency while conducting convoy escorts.

> *DISCUSSION:* Convoy escorts remain the most prevalent mission assigned to the MP platoons. MP squad and team leaders are well versed in conducting convoy escorts. These leaders conduct detailed briefings, which include routes, speed, distance, security measures at the halt, as well as battle drills for actions upon contact and other contingencies. The use of MP squads in escorting convoys ensures that sufficient communications, navigation skills, and firepower is present to maintain effective security at all times.

> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* MP should continue to conduct convoy escorts. Given the limited number of MP squads available, the brigade needs to be very selective when tasking MPs to secure those convoys that are deemed critical to the unit's operation. A good example is the escort of CL IV (barrier materiel)/V (ammunition) during the defense preparation.

<div align="right">(TA.6.1.2.3 Facilitate Movement on Routes)</div>

TREND 4

SUBJECT: Military oriented protective posture (MOPP) analysis

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 CHEM): The brigade chemical (CHEM) officers successfully conducted MOPP analysis.

> *DISCUSSION:* The brigade chemical officer's analysis on the flexible response to the threat with MOPP gear was good and resulted in units being allowed to lower MOPP posture to ensure maximum protection at required locations based on intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The impact of this task greatly enhanced the capabilities of the unit while minimizing the percentage of casualties on the battlefield.

> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Practical application MOPP analysis can be the difference between mission failure and mission success. Brigade chemical officers could improve or

develop new techniques to maximize the effects by reading **FM 3-14,** *Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Vulnerability Analysis* and **FM 101-5,** *Staff Organization and Operations.*

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 5

SUBJECT: Chemical downwind hazard predictions

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Chemical staff personnel understand how to correctly plot chemical downwind hazards.

> *DISCUSSION:* Once brigade and battalion headquarters receive nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reports, chemical staff officers know the process of plotting the down wind hazard in accordance with **FM 3-3,** *Chemical and Biological Contamination Avoidance.*

> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Chemical staffs must understand the procedures outlined in **FM 3-3**. The staff must be able to brief the commander on the assumptions made in **Army Training Pamphlet (ATP) - 45** that once the downwind hazard is plotted, you are 99 percent sure that all the contamination is inside the downwind hazard plot, not that everything inside the downwind hazard area is going to be contaminated.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND: 6

SUBJECT: Protective services detail/security of critical assets

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Military police (MP) squads provide adequate security for the brigade commander.

> *DISCUSSION:* A majority of units task the MP platoon with providing one squad to security for the brigade commander. The MP squad assigned this task is normally well rehearsed and maintains good situational awareness at all times.

> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* While this mission is important, it should not be the sole function of an MP squad. Most units keep the same squad "on call" at the brigade tactical operations center (TOC) in the event that the brigade commander decides to go out on battlefield circulation. It has been a trend that if a platoon gives a squad the "on order" mission of providing security for the brigade commander, they may later be employed in a more valuable

capacity.

<div align="right">(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)</div>

TREND: 7

SUBJECT: Use of thermal systems by anti-tank (AT) crews

OBSERVATION (TF 2): AT crews consistently maximize the use of thermal sights to achieve battlefield surprise, security, and standoff.

DISCUSSION: Anti-tank crews have exhibited greater comfort and proficiency in using their thermal night sights during the entire range of their operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). In addition to the typical anti-armor defensive scenario, units have increased their use of thermals while operating in semi-wooded terrain to maximize security. Mounted patrols during low intensity conflict (LIC) employ thermal sights to increase detection range. Likewise, traffic control points are using thermals to provide better observation and early warning during LIC and K force (KFOR) operations. Counterreconnaissance operations have at times depended almost exclusively on AT thermal sights to detect the enemy's mounted and dismounted assets. From support by fire positions in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), crews have been able to relay enemy dispositions to maneuver commanders.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: With the fielding of the improved tube-launched optically-tracked wire guided (TOW) acquisition sight (ITAS), units and crews need to continue to emphasize the utility of thermal detection during all types of military operations. Home station training on the TOW tactical trainer system will increase gunners' proficiency. Optimizing limited visibility training will reinforce the crews' awareness that thermal usage is both effective and necessary.

<div align="right">(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)</div>

TREND: 8

SUBJECT: Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance (recon) and dual-purpose individual and collective 54B training

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 CHEM): NBC reconnaissance and dual-purpose squads are technically proficient in their respective areas (individual/collective 54B tasks).

DISCUSSION: NBC recon and dual-purpose squads are proficient employing their internal assets and support. Squads and/or platoons are

able to employ their internal assets to conduct a reconnaissance, decontamination, and smoke missions. The drills associated at the individual and collective 54B squad are well rehearsed and synchronized.

SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: NBC recon and dual-purpose units should continue to emphasize squad level training to improve perishable NBC skills. Squad level training should include scenarios with the possible lack of brigade or battalion external support due to battlefield destruction, enemy compromise (capture, lack of clear routes, and so on) to enable the platoon to formulate alternatives to complete the mission. Continue to maintain and improve squad and platoon level standing operating procedures (SOPs).

(TA.6.3.1.4 Employ Protective Equipment)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Multiple subscriber equipment (MSE) company signal site security

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 SIG): Signal leaders do not plan and execute proper site defense.

DISCUSSION: The company leadership usually takes too little time, if any, to review brigade operations orders, analyze the enemy threat, or determine the defense condition (DEFCON) level as directed by the brigade commander and/or brigade support area commander. Therefore, the company cannot properly plan for or conduct adequate site defense. The companies usually install concertina wire, trip flares, and early warning devices on the perimeter. Depending on the availability of engineer support, they dig some two-man fighting positions, but these positions rarely have overhead cover. The first sergeant or node center platoon sergeant often positions guards on the company's sector of the perimeter defense. There are no personal defensive positions within the sites. The platoon does not establish medical support and evacuation procedures that fit into the site defense plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: FM 11-43, *Signal Leader's Guide* reads: "Signal sites must be able to defend against sabotage, ground forces, and airborne/air assault forces with little or no outside help. They must also be prepared to survive enemy air, artillery, and nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) attack." There are different signal sites and different considerations must be made when planning defense for each site. Current threat status/situation is an important factor when planning and committing assets and personnel to defend a site. Use mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time (METT-T) considerations and order priorities accordingly. Since the node center deployed and set up in the brigade support area (BSA), it is categorized

as a collocated site. In most cases at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the platoon is responsible for a portion of the brigade support area (BSA) perimeter defense. Carefully coordinate with collocating units. In accordance with the threat, establish overhead cover and plans to react to indirect fire and air attack. Then set up defensive positions with interlocking fields of fire on the assigned sector of the perimeter. Within the site, set up personal defensive positions and survivability positions. Ensure communications exist to dismount points, fighting positions, and casualty evacuation points. Establish rally points and a reactionary force plan if required. Plan for medical support and evacuation. Set up a viable sleep plan that integrates into the work/defense plan. Finally, rehearse the plans.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems)

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Ground security plan

OBSERVATION (LF DIV): The mortar platoon doesn't establish a viable ground security plan to protect the mortar firing position.

> *DISCUSSION:* Responsibility of the ground security plan is a specified task of the platoon leader per **FM 7-90,** ***Tactical Employment of Mortars.***
>
> ***TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:*** The ground security plan consists of positioning listening posts (LPs)/observation posts (OPs), placing crew served weapons down most likely enemy avenues of approach, establishing a fighting position for every soldier with interlocking fields of fire, and emplacing early warning devices. The security plan should encompass 360 degrees. Supplementary and alternate positions should be worked into the priorities of work.
>
> **Example**: The PL immediately starts working the ground security plan upon occupying a mortar firing position.

(TA.6.3.1.1 Protect Individual and Systems)

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Security

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Units consistently fail to ensure security is maintained while halted, during movement, and while conducting priorities of work in assembly areas.

> *DISCUSSION:* During security halts, team and squad leaders fail to supervise and enforce the unit's security posture. Typically, leaders do

not assign sectors of fire, emplace key weapons, or ensure that soldiers seek cover and concealment. In assembly areas, leaders fail to emplace key weapons, assign sectors of fire, or conduct any direct or indirect fire planning in case of enemy contact. Security levels are rarely disseminated or enforced.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units should conduct leader training to ensure that unit standards are clearly understood. Leaders at all levels must enforce the standards routinely and demonstrate proficiency during home station external evaluations (EXEVALs).

(TA 6.3.4 Provide Counter Recon Security and Readiness)

TREND 4

SUBJECT: Heavy weapons company counter reconnaissance

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 NBC): Delta companies are not effectively executing battalion-level counter reconnaissance missions.

DISCUSSION: Typically, team delta with 3-4 anti-tank (AT) platoons will execute battalion counter-recon prior to a deliberate defense. The following trends have prevented consistent success: the lack of screen line reconnaissance, rehearsals, infantry augmentation, and combined arms integration. Most prominently, the "hunter-killer" concept is being ignored. Often, the scouts are screening another battalion's flank, and no infantry squads are attached to team delta. This, along with a lack of alternate observation post (OP) positions, results in no depth or ability to maneuver to kill enemy recon assets. There is no standoff to allow for the usage of indirect fires; there is no direct cross-talk with aviation assets to both warn and allow screen line forces to adjust. In essence, AT sections are stationary and simply waiting and hoping that enemy recon assets "bump into them." The unit's ability to develop and rehearse an effective plan is further hampered by needlessly delayed occupation of the screen line, usually just prior to or after darkness. Junior leaders have not been able to confirm or deny mounted/dismounted avenues of approach in their sectors, and they consequently do not refine the company fire plan. Units with adequate "hunter-killer" task organization and good indirect fire plans typically kill over 75% of recon assets in their sector and initiate over 80% of the engagements.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Heavy weapons commanders must realize there is no substitute for maximum "boots on the ground" time. Likewise, they have to ensure they are resourced with an appropriate "hunter-killer" task organization. Finally, leaders must aggressively seek out coordination with supporting arms (field artillery, aviation, etc.) and ensure rehearsals are conducted. An especially effective method is for the commander via frequency modulated (FM) radio to create "situations" that force platoon leaders and section leaders to react appropriately (send a call for fire, move to an alternate

position, etc.).

(TA 6.3.4 Provide Counter Recon Security and Readiness)

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Preventative maintenance checks and services (PMCS)

OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): Units deploy to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) with a clear understanding of company level maintenance operations.

> *DISCUSSION:* The best evidence of this is the recent unit's operational readiness during all phases of operations. Due to the unstable nature of operations during the rotation, deploying units quickly grasp the concept that in an environment like JRTC maintenance must be conducted as often as possible and to standard.
>
> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Sustain the above.

<div align="right">(TA.7.3.2.1 Perform Preventative Maintenance)</div>

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and basic first aid

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Military police (MP) teams continue to efficiently conduct CASEVAC and render immediate first aid.

> *DISCUSSION:* The majority of MP platoons are highly successful at executing CASEVAC operations. The platoon leadership enforces high standards, which ensures that that proper first aid is rapidly administered and no wounded personnel are left on the battlefield. This has a direct result in the minimal died-of-wounds rate that is normally seen within the MP platoons during rotations. The success is attributed to the high number of certified combat lifesavers within the MP platoon. The standard within most MP platoons is a minimum of one combat lifesaver with aid bag per MP team.
>
> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Continue to capitalize on the use, training, and maintenance of certified combat lifesavers while at home station. Rehearse contingencies in the event that combat lifesavers or medics are not immediately available. Train on request for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and keep a nine-line request format posted near the radio.

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)

OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): There has been a noticeable improvement in the identification and treatment of casualties at the platoon and company level.

> *DISCUSSION:* Leaders and soldiers developed a no nonsense approach to the treatment and evacuation of casualties that resulted in soldiers returning to duty quickly, thereby improving the combat readiness of the unit. Numerous times young sub-unit leaders and soldiers were observed taking the initiative, in the absence of orders, to ensure that injured soldiers were treated and evacuated from the battlefield. It is clearly evident that soldiers at every level are involved in taking care of the wounded.
>
> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Sustain the above.

(TA.7.4.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 4

SUBJECT: Soldiers' load

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Although units arrive at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) with considerable equipment, leaders are tailoring the soldiers' load to match the mission.

> *DISCUSSION:* Units are planning contingencies, identifying equipment requirements early, and relying on the re-supply system. Proper logistical planning allows units to lighten their loads resulting in more mobility and quicker reactions to enemy contact. Units routinely cache and secure equipment in assembly areas or patrol bases in order to reduce the soldiers' load to an absolute minimum. Additionally, the use of the assault pack and "camel back" improve the soldiers' comfort and their ability to move while in contact.
>
> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* As the logistics planners in the rifle companies, executive officers must ensure they develop a reliable re-supply system and plan in order to lighten the soldiers' load.

(TA.7.5.2 Supply the Force)

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Platoon maintenance operations

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 EN): Engineer platoons are not properly planning for and executing an adequate maintenance plan for the duration of the operation

> *DISCUSSION:* Engineer units generally do a good job of performing daily vehicle preventative maintenance checks (PMCS) and usually are able to maintain an operational readiness (OR) rate of above 90%. Vehicle maintenance has direct command involvement and is incorporated into the platoon's daily priorities of work. Operators conduct routine PMCS before, during, and after operations. Soldiers are routinely observed greasing their vehicles and checking fluids. Maintenance in the areas of communication; trailers; weapons; and sets, kits, and outfits (SKOs) is, however, generally lacking. For example, radios fail because connections have not been properly cleaned, wheels fall off of trailers because operators perform PMCS on the vehicle but not the trailer, crew served weapons jam because they have not been cleaned or oiled over a period of several days, and mine detectors are inoperable because operators have not changed the batteries.
>
> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Leaders must develop, enforce, and personally supervise maintenance priorities of work that include full spectrum maintenance to include vehicles, trailers, communications, weapons, personnel, and SKOs. Maintenance personnel can be used to spot check the company or platoon system to ensure compliance. A daily battle rhythm should be established to ensure long-term operability of a unit's systems during a period of continuous operations.
>
> (TA.7.3.2.1 Perform Preventative Maintenance)

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Units consistently fail to develop a realistic CASEVAC plan.

> *DISCUSSION:* The planning for CASEVAC is not emphasized. All focus is directed on the maneuver plan and leaders ignore the reality of casualties. CASEVAC is merely a "check the block" action during the preparation and execution of orders. Execution of CASEVAC is a reaction rather than a planned action. Resources are not fully utilized during CASEVAC (helicopters, non-standard vehicles, M113s).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Companies must consider CASEVAC during their mission analysis and include it throughout the planning process. The desired end-state is that companies should always have a dedicated and rehearsed asset for CASEVAC.

(TA.7.4.2 Evacuate Casualties)

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Stinger missile forecast, requisition, and distribution

OBSERVATION (BDE C^2 ADA): The battery leadership fails to understand their role in stinger missile forecast, requisition, and distribution planning.

DISCUSSION: Commanders and first sergeants typically do not anticipate requirements based on consumption rates, enemy threat, and upcoming missions. Often the battery commander does not submit a required supply rate (RSR) for the mission being planned. Requisition follow-ups are not conducted to confirm when Stinger missiles are planned for delivery on the brigade re-supply matrix. First sergeants and platoon sergeants do not understand how to use logistics packages (LOGPACs) or how to articulate their units' requirements to brigade (BDE)/battalion (BN) S4s. These factors result in reactive measures to order missiles when the battery becomes critically short and/or missiles are not delivered to necessary locations in time to affect the battle.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The battery leadership must conduct detailed planning for Stinger missile forecasting, requisitioning, and distribution. Required supply rates (RSRs) are turned in to the BDE S4 for anticipated consumption rates, losses due to enemy air and ground threat (direct, indirect fires, and minefield effects on air defense fire units), and future missions (at least 48-72 hours out). The first sergeant coordinates with the brigade S4 and support operations officer (SPO) to ensure that Stingers are on the re-supply matrix and their delivery to the brigade support area (BSA) is coordinated with air defense artillery personnel present during distribution. The first sergeant at rear command post personnel coordinates with the ammunition transfer point (ATP) section for his missiles and assists BN task force field trains personnel for inclusion of missiles in their LOGPACs. Platoon sergeants conduct link up with LOGPACs at the logistics release point (LRP) to deliver the missiles or coordinate for further transportation to team locations. The first sergeant must assist the commander in the development and execution of plans to sustain general support (GS) assets. Units should refer to **FM 44-44,** ***Avenger Platoon, Section, and Squad Operations***, **FM 44-64,** ***SHORAD Battalion and Battery Operations***, and **FM 7-20,** ***The Infantry Battalion****.*

(TA.7.5.2.x3 Request Supplies)

TREND 4

SUBJECT: 60mm mortar ammunition management at the company level

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Company fire support officers (FSOs) and mortar section sergeants routinely experience difficulty in maintaining an accurate count of 60mm mortar ammunition rounds on hand.

> *DISCUSSION:* Company FSOs and mortar section sergeants are seldom aware of the 60 mm ammo status throughout the company. After rounds are broken down for transport during company movements and offensive operations, key leaders loose track of where all the rounds are, and how many are or should be on hand. Additionally, there is generally no plan for the consolidation of this ammo for use when required which leads to unforeseen shortages that strain re-supply efforts, slow the replenishment of ammunition, and cause not enough ammo to be on hand at the mortar section to execute effective fire support.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Company FSOs and mortar section sergeants need to develop and comply with a company ammunition standing operating procedure (SOP). Require one member from the fire direction center (FDC) to keep an accurate log of all rounds issued to the platoons for transport and a fire mission log that includes the number and type of rounds fired in each mission. Establish procedures that include ammo accountability down to the platoon level (have platoon sergeants track and account for all 60mm ammunition if the ammo is broken down to be carried by individual soldiers, much like he does for all other ammunition issued to the platoon). The platoon sergeant should then report the rounds on hand as part of his daily ammo count to the company headquarters.

> (TA.7.5.2.xx.3 Supply the Force)

TREND 5

SUBJECT: Internment/resettlement operations

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Military police platoons are not sufficiently involved in enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations.

> *DISCUSSION:* Doctrinally, MPs are responsible for the proper handling, processing, safeguarding, and reporting of all EPW/civilian internees (CI). At times, due to limited MP assets the brigades do not require the MP platoon to conduct EPW/CI operation and the MI company performs the mission assisted by the forward support battalion. The brigade ultimately fails to provide the division with required information, logs, and status reports on EPW/CI. Additionally, the brigades do not maintain and forward the required forms (DD Form 629, receipt of prisoner or detained person; DA Form 4137, evidence/property custody

document; DA Form 5976, enemy prisoner of war capture tag or local equivalent) for EPW/CI accountability.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Military police must be involved in EPW/CI operations. If there are other operational requirements for the MP platoon, it is advisable to require at least MP supervision/advisement over the processing and reporting. The platoon should enforce the guidelines for processing EPW/CI in accordance with the company and division tactical standing operating procedures, **FM 19-4,** *Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security and Enemy Prisoner of War Operations*, and **FM 19-40,** *Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons*. Additionally, brigades should develop a contingency EPW support package that identifies the necessary class (CL) I (subsistence) and IV (barrier materiel) items required for conducting and sustaining EPW/CI operations (**FM 19-40**, Chapter 2). Brigades should also place the construction of the EPW cage on the brigade support area (BSA) execution matrix to ensure proper focus and priority.

Example:

- The MP platoon leader develops a rotational plan, which has two squads "up" conducting missions, and one squad "down" executing priorities of work, troop leading procedures (TLPs), and a rest plan. The "down" squad is located at the EPW cage within the BSA in an "on call" status should any EPWs arrive.
- The MP platoon leader co-locates his platoon command post at the EPW cage within the BSA. The headquarters section, to include the platoon sergeant, is available to supervise/assist other soldiers tasked with conducting EPW/CI operations.

(TA.7.7 Provide Military Police Support)

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

Part One (Positive Performance Trends 1 - 2 & Needs Emphasis Trends 1-20)

(Trends are numbered sequentially for cross-reference and are not in any priority order.)

Positive Performance

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Team level reporting procedures/situational awareness

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Fire unit situational awareness and cross talk provide the platoon leader battlefield awareness.

> *DISCUSSION:* Team level situational awareness and reporting contributes to the overall battlefield situational awareness of the platoon leader. Cross talk between teams and the platoon leader enhances fire unit survivability and lethality.

> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* During home station training, fire units are proactive in providing the platoon leader with continuous battlefield updates. Platoon standing operating procedures (SOPs) mandate frequent radio updates and procedures for reporting activities observed on the battlefield. Information provided by the fire units greatly increases the platoon leader's ability to effectively command and control his platoon and ensure their survivability.

> (TA.4.1 Acquire Information and Communicate Information and Maintain Status)

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Sensor management plan

OBSERVATION (BDE C^2 ADA): The sensor section sergeant and battery commander are developing a sensor management plan and including it in the battery operations order (OPORD). The sensor management plan is briefed in the battery OPORD and during the battery rehearsal.

> *DISCUSSION:* Battery commanders and sentinel section sergeants are jointly developing sensor management annexes. These annexes provide the necessary information down to the platoon leader and shooter level that facilitates a more consistent digital connectivity.

> *SUSTAINMENT TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Sustain sentinel section sergeants understanding of the maneuver commander's plan, intent, and how the air defense artillery (ADA) battery adds to the fight, this contributes to an improved sensor management annex. The

annexes must include at a minimum architecture for the forward area air defense (FAAD) command, control, communications and intelligence (C^3I); contingency plans; frequency management plan; DEW rebroadcast procedures; and sensor section combat service support (CSS) plan.

Refine contingency plans to include procedures for what to do in the event that a node or radar should experience maintenance problems, become destroyed, or move. Annexes must detail to the fire unit level what contingency plan to execute and what frequency to switch to in order to maintain digital connectivity.

Continue to produce sensor management annexes at home station to include briefing the plan during OPORDs and rehearsals. Platoon leaders must continue to brief electronic warfare (EW) issues in platoon OPORDs and rehearsals to reinforce the overall battery sensor management plan down to the shooter level. Refer to **FM 44-48, _Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Sensor Platoon_**, Appendix G.

(TA.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

Needs Emphasis

TREND 1

SUBJECT: Reporting

OBSERVATION (TF 1): During the movement to contact phase at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), units in contact do not report to their higher headquarters (HQ) expeditiously.

> _DISCUSSION:_ Reports are often incomplete and untimely. Commanders cannot integrate combined arms and other organic units into the find, fix, finish functions because they are unaware of contact, and they fail to document contacts and enemy indicators to develop the enemy situation for follow-on operations. Units at JRTC do not recognize the enemy situation and fail to develop courses of action based on the enemy situation. Consequently, units execute terrain oriented plans designed to "clear" terrain instead of finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy.
>
> During the movement to contact phase, most units at JRTC execute courses of action based on a generic enemy situation template (SITTEMP). However, once the battle is joined the enemy situation often diverges from the SITTEMP which should drive changes to the plan. Platoons and companies are focused on fighting the plan instead of recognizing the enemy courses of action and developing plans to defeat them. Units do not report enemy indicators such as contacts, vehicle tracks, and caches' to their higher HQ. At company level this means that the commander cannot reinforce his squads and platoons in

contact with combined arms or additional forces in a timely manner or develop the enemy situation. Everything the opposing force (OPFOR) does is a clue to his course of action. If units lack the tools or training to capture and analyze these clues, then they are destined to fight the plan instead of the enemy and will probably miss the opportunity to defeat the OPFOR. Since platoons and companies lack the tools and know how, it follows that the task force does not receive the information necessary to maneuver the battalion in a meaningful way.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Train platoon leaders to immediately report contacts and indicators using a S-size, A-activity, L-location, T-time format. This will allow the commander to immediately develop the situation to maneuver forces and integrate combined arms. This will also allow the company executive officer or first sergeant to start putting into action measures to expedite casualty evacuation or re-supply. Train company radio telephone operators (RTOs) to document these enemy indicators on a formatted, water-proofed report matrix. Use this matrix to constantly update a enemy situation map. A map that shows enemy activity will allow the commander to analyze the enemy situation over a period of time, and develop a plan to defeat the enemy in the company zone. Train company RTOs to immediately send reports to the task force tactical operations center (TOC), so that the battalion S2, S3, and commander can develop the situation and maneuver forces in the task force zone. Train soldiers and leaders how the OPFOR fights and to thereby recognize enemy indicators. Train soldiers and leaders to conduct crater analysis.

(TA.4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 2

SUBJECT: Information dissemination

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Information dissemination to the soldier level continues to impact unit performance.

DISCUSSION: Information flow is routinely stopped at the platoon leader/sergeant level and fails to be disseminated to the squad leader, vehicle commander, and soldier level.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: We have the best soldiers and junior leaders in the world, but they need information to accomplish the mission. Unit leadership at a minimum should provide a task and purpose and the commanders intent to their subordinates.

(TA.4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 3

SUBJECT: Communication in the hospital

OBSERVATION (ECHELON ABOVE DIV): Communication within the hospital is slow to be established.

DISCUSSION: Communication within the hospital between the ward, emergency medical treatment (EMT), pharmacy, laboratory, and radiology (PLX) and tactical operations center (TOC) are not well defined and established until well after the exercise has begun. This continually puts the hospital into a crisis mode as patients begin to come into the hospital and need tests, surgery or to be admitted. A communication plan between the hospital and the TOC should be established as the hospital is being set up or better yet prior to starting the set up.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Develop a plan before the hospital is established as to how the communication will be executed. Make a decision early on as to who will communicate with the air and ground ambulances as well as who will have dispatch authority for ground ambulances and launch authority for air ambulances.

(TA.4.1.1 Communicate Information)

TREND 4

SUBJECT: Tactical operations center (TOC)/tactical administrative center (TAC) operations

OBSERVATION (TF 1): Units have no procedures in place to facilitate efficient TOC/TAC operations.

DISCUSSION: Units do not have a clear understanding of which command and control (C^2) node is responsible for a given function or part of the battlefield. C^2 nodes move around the battlefield with no clear route, security plan, or occupation plan. Many times a C^2 node departs the TOC without proper or needed equipment.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Do not overlook C^2 during the war game or during any synchronization drill. During the war game C^2 for each part of the operation should be determined and redundancy added. Address C^2 during rehearsals. During the rehearsal have each C^2 node explain what they are responsible for, where they are going to be located, and what C^2 hand offs are going to occur, if any. Address C^2 nodes in the unit TOC standing operating procedures (SOP). Assign a non-commissioned officer (NCO) for each node. Make that NCO responsible for training, manning, and executing that C^2 node. Develop a hasty timeline that addresses the launching of any C^2 node from the

TOC.

<div align="center">(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)</div>

TREND 5

SUBJECT: Echelonment of command posts

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Battalions break down main command posts (CPs) and communications without establishing alternate command and control (C^2) nodes.

> *DISCUSSION:* When displacing main command posts, most battalions fail to establish a tactical administrative center (TAC) or alternate CP than can maintain communications and command and control while the main command post is moving.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Battalions must practice displacing the main command post during home station training and must ensure that the TAC, combat trains command post (CTCP), and battalion missile tracking radar fire support element, practice taking the battle while the main CP moves.

<div align="center">(TA.4.1.2 Manage Means of Communicating Information)</div>

TREND 6

SUBJECT: Re-transmission (RETRANS) operations

OBSERVATION (BDE C^2 SIG): Signal officers and non-commissioned officers are being reactive and not proactive. RETRANS missions should be planned, provided security and allowed to execute the mission.

> *DISCUSSION:* Every brigade combat team (BCT) training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) during the last two years listed RETRANS team operations as a "needs improvement." The trend at JRTC is that RETRANS missions are emergency missions and less than 20% of the RETRANS teams deployed accomplish their intended mission. RETRANS planning is not included in the military decision-making process (MDMP) and units lack detailed RETRANS planning, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Employment of a RETRANS team is a combat operation and should be organized as a combined arms team. Compartmentalizing RETRANS team employment as an S6 only operation is a formula for disaster. Integrate RETRANS operations with the MDMP. Develop effective TTPs and consider movement, force protection, logistics, and operations security (OPSEC).

TREND 7

SUBJECT: Information management in the tactical operations center (TOC)

OBSERVATION (TF 2): TOCs typically do not manage information well.

> *DISCUSSION:* Most TOC personnel have not received adequate training in information management at home station. For example, TOC radiotelephone operators (RTOs) are not familiar with message traffic formats or standing operating procedures (SOPs). They do not understand commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and are not proficient enough to execute routine duties without significant supervision from the battle non-commissioned officer (NCO). Additionally, battle captains and battle NCOs are unfamiliar or unclear on their roles and responsibilities in the TOC. The different battlefield operating system (BOS) elements within the TOC are normally compartmentalized and do not receive or send information to the battle NCO adequately. Battle NCOs/captains normally focus on the operations cell but disregard the S2, fire support element (FSE), and other assets within the TOC. The result is poor battle tracking, poor information flow, and poor situational awareness.
>
> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Units should conduct home sattion triaing focusing on TOC battle drills, message handling procedures, and battle tracking.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 8

SUBJECT: Corps support group (CSG)/corps support battalion (CSB) tactical operations center (TOC) common operational picture

OBSERVATION (ECHELONS ABOVE DIV): The CSG and CSB TOCs are challenged to maintain a common operational picture.

> *DISCUSSION:* This is especially true when multiple events, reports, or situations occur simultaneously. In many cases the battle staffs in the TOC and/or administrative logistics operations center (ALOC) do not have a common operational picture even when they are collocated within feet of each other. The staff must be able to provide the commander with an accurate and single common operational picture to enable him/her to make timely decisions. Maintaining a common operational picture among the command group, battle staff, subordinate units, adjacent units (combat support hospital), and higher headquarters

will also streamline the abbreviated decision making process.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

- Standardize and rehearse the shift briefing format and the battle update brief (BUB).
- Conduct shift changes in an organized manner with all battle staff present. The executive officer (XO) must enforce attendance, timeliness, and accuracy.
- XO/battle captain must conduct standardized staff huddles. This simple procedure will vastly improve situational awareness in the TOC.
- Identify, train, and rehearse information flow within a TOC. Recommend using a multiple copy report format that can be reviewed by the battle non-commissioned officer (NCO) then distributed to the battle staff. Recommend the battle NCO maintain a DA 1594 for important events.
- Use and maintain a significant activity log. Recommend a visual chart (butcher block) with the date time group (DTG) annotated.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 9

SUBJECT: Patient tracking

OBSERVATION (ECHELONS ABOVE DIV): The medical regulating officer (MRO) and patient administration and disposition (PAD) have difficulty-tracking patients.

DISCUSSION: When either multiple integrated laser engagement simulation (MILES) or real world patients are brought into the hospital, the patients are not being tracked as to where there are at any given time in the hospital. It is unknown if the patients are in the X-ray department or have been admitted. When the MRO prepares mobile aeromedical staging facility (MASF) runs, they are unable to find patients and stage them in a timely manner to be able to get to the MASF within the time frame they have been given.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Factors that affect the ability to track patients include having PAD personnel in the triage area when patients arrive. The PAD must have a plan for securing sensitive items and maintaining an inventory. The MRO and PAD must work together when building a manifest for a MASF. Backwards planning must be done to assure that all items that need to go with the patient such as medications, medical records, and sensitive items such as weapons get to the patient. The patients have to be staged ready to load the vehicles for the MASF. The PAD person should be able to know where the patients are and match the patient up with their equipment and supplies.

TREND 10

SUBJECT: Situational awareness

OBSERVATION (ECHELONS ABOVE DIV): Combat service support (CSS) units are challenged developing situational awareness and battle tracking critical supplies, equipment, personnel, and missions.

DISCUSSION: Situational awareness is an understanding of the situation as the basis for making a decision or simply: &#x201Cunderstanding oneself, the enemy, and the terrain or environment" (**FM 101-5,** *Staff Organization and Operations*). Situational awareness development is generally poorly conducted with the following results:

- No tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) or inadequate detail
- Poor reporting discipline
- Incomplete report submission
- Inadequate reporting procedures and formats
- Compliance not enforced
- Poor radio communications
- Lack of knowledge of when and what to report
- No established battle rhythm
- Poor understanding of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).

Friendly and enemy situation/locations, maneuver graphics, known and templated obstacles, route status, equipment status, personnel status, and critical/key supply status are not adequately reported, tracked, and disseminated to the subordinate units by the staff. The failure of the support operations section to track critical/key supply status and adequately track mission start and completion also contribute to poor situational awareness

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Leaders must be familiar with **FM101-5,** *Staff Organization and Operations*. &#x201CThe key to effective information management is answering the CCIR." **FM 3-0,** *Operations* states that commanders must identify their CCIR, including priority intelligence requirements (PIR), essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), and friendly forces information requirements (FFIR). **Call Newsletter 95-7,** *Tactical Operations Center* identifies six basic tactical operations center (TOC) functions: 1) receive information, 2) distribute information, 3) analyze information, 4) submit recommendations to the commander, 5) integrate resources, and 6) synchronize resources.

TREND 11

SUBJECT: Tactical operations center (TOC) common operational picture

OBSERVATION (TF 1): Throughout these two quarters TOCs had trouble maintaining a common operational picture. This is especially true when multiple events, reports or situations begin to occur simultaneously.

> *DISCUSSION:* TOCs are not maintaining a clear picture of their zone or their adjacent unit's zone. In some instances TOCs do not even maintain a common operational picture among the battle staff even though they are located within several feet of each other. The TOC must keep the single common operational picture that is as accurate as possible. A common operation picture among the battle staff, command group, subordinate units, adjacent units, and higher headquarters streamlines the decision making process. A correct common operational picture allows commanders to make the right decision at the right time.
>
> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Hold staff huddles during or immediately following an operation or series of confusing events. The huddle must include the entire battle staff and must focus on the event in question. No single staff officer has the corner on truth. This technique allows the whole staff to hear what happen and allows them to decide what they must do now to support the force. This technique also allows the executive officer and battle captain to piece together the entire event.
>
> Identify, train, and rehearse a reporting format. This simple procedure will streamline reporting and vastly improve situational awareness in the TOC. Untrained radiotelephone operators (RTOs) with no set reporting format cripple information flow within a task force.
>
> Identify, train, and rehearse information flow within a TOC. Use a multiple copy report format that can be proofed by the battle non-commissioned officer (NCO) then distributed to the battle staff. File these reports on a clipboard. The battle NCO should maintain a DA Form 1594 for important events. Use a significant activity log. Use a butcher block so that all the battle staff can see the significant activities. Hold shift changes in a very organized manner with all battle staff present. The executive officer must enforce attendance and format.

TREND 12

SUBJECT: Casualty Operations

OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): Casualty reporting/tracking needs to be emphasized within the brigade combat team. Brigade S1s and battalion S1s do not understand their roles as the casualty manager/planner. The brigade combat team generally fails to report casualties using DA Forms 1156 (Casualty Feeder Reports), 1155 (Casualty Witness Statements).

> *DISCUSSION:* Casualty management begins during the military decision-making process (MDMP) process with the S1 completing a casualty estimate. The estimate must answer the questions who, what, when, where, why, and how. Furthermore, soldiers do not understand the process of reporting casualties because they are not trained. The result is delayed reports, reports not submitted using the proper forms, or not being submitted at all. The brigade and the battalion S1s generally rely on the medical personnel or facilities to track casualties early in battle and fail to set up casualty liaison personnel.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* The brigade and battalions S1s must ensure that soldiers are trained on casualty reporting procedures and forms. The reporting process is addressed in the **FM 7-8,** *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, and **FM 12-6,** *Personnel Doctrine*. The S1 at each level is responsible to ensure that procedures are in place and that every soldier understands and is trained in casualty operations. The tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) must be detailed and specific in addressing casualty operations procedures. It is imperative that the S1 is involved during the planning process because the S1 is responsible for the casualty estimate. The S1 uses the estimate to anticipate future requirements. The S1 must continually assess the combat power of personnel before, during, and after operations. The S1 must be prepared to consolidate and reorganize quickly to sustain the momentum. This can only be accomplished through proper reporting and tracking. Casualty liaison teams must be established early and maintained throughout the operation to speed up the process. Casualty operations demand more manpower than a unit is resourced to provide. It is imperative that the S1s at each level have a plan to track casualties early. One way to accomplish this mission is to send a soldier with the forward logistical element (FLE) to locate at the casualty collection points (CCPs).

> (TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 13

SUBJECT: Compromise procedures

OBSERVATION (BDE C² SIG): Signal officer (SIGO) and signal non-commissioned officers (NCOs) do not battle track what communication security (COMSEC) items are issued out to units. No COMSEC inventories are executed.

> *DISCUSSION:* When a real or suspected compromise occurs, units

cannot make an informed decision because they do not know what COMSEC was involved and they do not have procedures for assessing the impact of the compromise or developing recommendations for the commander. This delays the process to restore communication security.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Develop and follow tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), which support effective standardized deterrent measures against compromises. The following seven-step procedure, developed at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) is recommended as a response to a compromise: notify, verify, analyze, decide, report, act and confirm. Signal officers need to develop a battle tracking system for COMSEC and net identification for radio and COMSEC fill devices and include compromised procedures rehearsal during communication exercises (COMEXs).

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 14

SUBJECT: Situational awareness and battle tracking

OBSERVATION (BDE C^2 ENG): Engineer units lack adequate situational awareness on the battlefield and do not adequately battle track key supplies, personnel, or equipment.

DISCUSSION: FM 5-0, *Staff Organization and Operations* defines situational awareness or battlefield understanding as "understanding oneself, the enemy, and the terrain or environment." This creates an understanding of the situation as the basis for making a decision. Battle tracking can be defined as situational awareness over time. Situational awareness and battle tracking are generally conducted poorly within engineer companies, especially at the platoon and squad levels. A combination of factors contribute to this situation: poor reporting discipline (clear, concise, accurate), poor radio communications, inadequate reporting procedures and formats, incomplete report submission, lack of subordinate's knowledge of when and what to report, and poor use of the engineer commander's conference call (no agenda, no unit battle rhythm). These factors lead to the absence of a common operational picture for the engineer elements. For example, items such as templated enemy locations, maneuver graphics, known and templated obstacles, route status, equipment status, personnel status, and key supply status are not adequately reported and tracked at various levels within the engineer company. Most engineer leaders are only concerned with their own activities or operations within their assigned areas. They do not pay attention to or track activities in adjacent unit sectors. This is despite the fact that most engineer units can expect to operate throughout the brigade's entire area of operation and not just within one battalion's sector. Additionally, most maneuver elements rely on their engineers to track and provide information regarding the location of obstacles (friendly and enemy) and the status of routes throughout the entire area of operations (AO). The failure of

engineer leaders to adequately track and provide this information leads to various problems such as numerous mine strikes in the same enemy obstacle by different units.

Many conventional and family of scatterable minefields (FASCAM) are more dangerous to emplacing rotational units than the targeted enemy because emplacement and initiation are not reported, tracked, or disseminated. Key mine systems such as modular pack mine system (MOPMS) are seldom employed effectively because engineers fail to adequately track them (who has them and where are they). Additionally there is a lack of training on what is required and how to employ these systems. Therefore the level of detail required for battle tracking these systems in not understood. These details include: batteries, remote control units (RCUs), recycle time, and triggers. Failure to understand the battery requirements (BA5598E) for both the MOPMS and the RCU, failure to link an RCU with the MOPMS, lack of training on how and when to recycle the system, and poor understanding of the triggers tied to employment all contribute the poor effects achieved with MOPMS.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Leaders should be familiar with **FM 5-0,** *Staff Organization and Operations* and **FM 5-7-30,** *Brigade Engineer and Engineer Company Combat Operations (Airborne, Air Assault, Light)* in order to obtain specific Tops on battle tracking and situational awareness. Leaders should review **CALL Newsletters 95-7** *Tactical Operations Center* and **93-3** *Brigade/Battalion Staff* for recommendations on reports and tracking techniques. Standardized map boards and tracking mechanisms should be known and used at least down to the squad leader level. These mechanisms must be ruthlessly enforced in order to keep them updated and disseminated. Conducting a conference call or engineer battle update brief over the radio is a helpful method to share information critical to mobility/survivability operations. Platoon leaders must ensure that maneuver tactical operation center (TOC) personnel can update charts and track engineer information in the platoon leader's absence.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 15

SUBJECT: Situational awareness

OBSERVATION (BDE C^2 SIG): Leaders maintain little to no situational awareness

DISCUSSION: Initially, the company process of maintaining situational awareness is usually not standardized. The company operations and the node center operations do not have clear roles in the acquisition, analysis, and forwarding of information. Orders from higher are not received in a timely manner and orders that are received are usually incorrectly analyzed for importance and relevance. One direct result is a poorly established site defense plan. A majority of the soldiers ' time is spent employing concertina wire and early warning devices to ward off a

ground offense when the threat to the company is from air and indirect fire. This information is clearly outlined in brigade orders. Most of the time, the result is unnecessary casualties and damaged and destroyed communications equipment

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: According to **FM 100-6, Information Operations**, commanders, as well as leaders at all levels, must have information to command. Information is the medium that allows the commander's decision and execution cycle to function. Information gives direction to actions by the force, provides courses of action for protecting the force, and helps the force accomplish its operational mission. Relevant information drawn from a variety of sources supports the creation of situational awareness that contributes directly to effective command and control (C^2). C^2 in an environment of situational awareness helps the commander ensure unity of effort toward mission accomplishment. Ultimately, C^2 depends on the right person having the right information at the right time. One technique is for the company operations to be the center of the company's situational awareness. The operations personnel must be able to answer certain questions: Where am I? Where are my soldiers? What is their current status/activity? Where are adjacent and supporting units? Where is the enemy? What are the enemy's capabilities? Then they must be able to gather tools such as maps, graphics and overlays, situational logs, butcher blocks, visual displays, and anything else that works to make sure the questions are answered. Train on maintaining situational awareness by monitoring certain activities that may apply to the current threat such as the changing nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) threat (not just the mission oriented protection posture level); air threat (what does "yellow tight" really mean?); artillery threat (are we in enemy range fans?); ground threat (rear area, bypassed units, and snipers); and the general situation (is there a battle going on now? Tomorrow? Which way is the enemy?). Finally, this information must get to the appropriate person, whether it's the commander for planning, subordinate leaders for conducting rehearsals, or the soldier who is guarding the perimeter wondering if the movement outside the wire is the enemy or just a friendly patrol.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 16

SUBJECT: Battle tracking

OBSERVATION (BDE C^2 MP): Military police (MP) platoons do not effectively track their subordinate elements on the battlefield.

DISCUSSION: It has become an alarming trend that MPs continue to become casualties on the battlefield as a result of poor situational awareness. MP squads and teams have the unique ability to operate independently through their capabilities of mobility, firepower, and communications. It is, therefore, absolutely essential that these

elements, as well as the platoon headquarters, establish a viable and user-friendly means to maintain situational awareness and track themselves on the battlefield. Minefields are the number one reason MP teams are killed at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Most of the minefields (80 to 90 percent) that MPs encounter on the battlefield have been either confirmed or templated by the S2 in the brigade tactical operations center (TOC). On many occasions, MP teams are traveling the battlefield with no information on the current enemy situation or the location of adjacent friendly units. The potential for fratricide increases specifically during the hours of limited visibility.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: MP leaders must develop and enforce standing operating procedures (SOPs) that arm subordinate elements with the critical information to ensure their security on the battlefield. Control measures must be established (checkpoints, phase lines, and boundaries) and understood by every soldier. Proper reporting procedures must be maintained. Soldiers must clearly understand the current enemy situation, capabilities, most probable course of action, and the location of adjacent units. Heads-up-displays (HUDs) should clearly depict critical information.

Example:

- The platoon leader issues a squad leader the mission of conducting a convoy escort. Prior to completing his plan, the squad leader enters the brigade TOC and check with both the S2 and the brigade engineer for any changes on the route that he will be traveling.
- The platoon SOP requires that the MP squads communicate checkpoints along the routes as they are passed. The radiotelephone operator (RTO) updates their locations in the journal and on the map. The RTO understands that the next checkpoint should be communicated in approximately 20 minutes. After 30 minutes has passed with no communications, the RTO will attempt a radio check to confirm the squad's status.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 17

SUBJECT: Use of position azimuth determining system (PADS) survey at battery level

OBSERVATION (FIRE SPT DIV): Once PADS survey data becomes available, an increasing number of battery commanders refuse to use it to bring their units on common survey and they fail to inform the battalion (BN) tactical operation center (TOC) of their decision. BN fire direction centers (FDCs) and S3s do not verify that survey was not only provided, but also applied at the firing batteries and radar.

DISCUSSION: Battery commanders are making arbitrary survey

decisions that ease their own workload but keep their battalion from achieving common survey and accurate fires. The decisions are based on a lack of understanding of the need and meaning of common survey and of the true errors inherent in the gun laying and position system (GLPS)/precision lightweight global positioning receiver (PLGR) system that make it inferior to PADS-emplaced survey.

GLPS/PLGR is an acceptable method of establishing initial, marginally common directional and position control until PADS emplaced survey (based on assumed or actual 4th order data) becomes available. The potential for a minimum of a 10 meter position circular error probability (CEP) at each PLGR position, coupled with the small but not insignificant 0.2-0.4 mil directional error of each GLPS make it inferior to the near 0 meter/0 mil errors found in a properly emplaced set of PADS survey overhead shot (see **FM 6-50,** *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Battery*, page 4-9, **TM 9-6675-347-13&P**, and **FM 6-2,** *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Survey*, Chapter 13 for more detail).

The repercussions of this decisions is compounded by his/her failure to inform the battalion of the decision. The S3, fire direction officer (FDO), and fire support officer (FSO) improperly assume the battalion has achieved common survey and make critical decisions, such as acceptance of danger-close missions, on flawed data. The errors caused by non-common survey become evident as the battalion attempts to mass, or the radar and the designated counter fire battery (both on separate types of survey) attempt to put effective first round fires on an acquisition. The flawed data provided by the batteries makes the BN FDOs attempts to determine cause of the firing error extremely difficult.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Battalion S3s must ensure that all assets are on the best available common survey at all times. As better survey control becomes available, the S3 must have a system to ensure that it is rapidly disseminated, universally applied, and sustained. Battery commanders and FDCs must be required to report initial application of the directed survey method and to notify the TOC of any changes in its status. The battalion's survey standards and reporting/tracking TTPs should be included in the battalion standing operating procedures or included in the field artillery support plan (FASP).

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 18

SUBJECT: Battle tracking/information management

OBSERVATION (FS DIV): Field artillery (FA) battalion elements are not effectively tracking critical battlefield information

DISCUSSION: Fire support elements, FA battalion tactical operation centers (TOCs), and FA batteries are not effectively tracking friendly units or critical enemy actions (minefields/ambushes) across the brigade area of operations (AO). Units do not routinely plot or have situational awareness of all friendly indirect fire assets, current locations of friendly maneuver forces, or active minefields and ambushes. The result of poor battle tracking is a reduction in the ability of units to perform their basic fire support tasks. FA units take unnecessary casualties and risk failure in minefields and ambushes because no one takes the initiative to organize, track, and disseminate the data. Poor battle tracking results in fratricide.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

- Consider use of the information management techniques outlined in CALL 95-7, The Tactical Operations Center.
- Unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) must address requirements for battle tracking.
- Requirements for tracking of friendly units should be clearly identified. Examples of data to be tracked include firing unit locations, locations of all tactical operation centers (TOCs), air lines of communication (ALOC), ambulance exchange points (AXPs), locations of subordinate units, and locations of supporting general support (GS) assets.
- Requirements for the tracking of significant enemy data should also be standardized.
- Minefields and ambushes are typically our greatest killers in contingency operations, such as those replicated at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). The battalion and batteries must constantly track and update the status of these priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and other intelligence requirements (IR) through strong and regular contact with the supported maneuver and logistics units. A key person must be identified within the TOC on each shift who will be tasked to ensure the currency and dissemination of this data. The battalion (BN) TOC, prior to movement of any element, should establish a tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) requiring positive clearance of routes.
- The SOP must also address establishing a standard for dissemination of critical information within TOCs and battery operations centers (BOCs), as well as to their subordinate elements. Within the TOC, the combined use of the following tools seems most effective and aid in the swift and accurate dissemination of critical information: significant activities (SIGACTs) boards, "attention in the TOC" calls, duty logs with "check" boxes for peer and subordinate elements, and multi-sheet, multi-colored memo pads.
- External to the TOC/BOC the use of modified duty logs with "check" boxes for subordinate elements help the operations (OPS) non-commissioned officer (NCO) and battle captain verify that information has been sent and received.
- Standardized charts should be established in the SOP and used by all subordinate elements.
- The SOP should include a standardized shift-change checklist

used by the outgoing and incoming OPS NCOs (or BOC/battery fire direction non-commissioned officers) to verify that all critical map, chart, and duty log tasks have been performed to standard and are current. This same checklist can be used at different times during a shift by the battle captain, OPS NCO, and radiotelephone operators as a prompt to verify that they are up to date on critical battle-tracking tasks.

- At battery level, battery commanders must assign clear ownership of the BOC and its processes to key leaders within the battery and establish clear guidance and SOPs for its role in field operations. **FM 7-10**, *The Infantry Rifle Company*, pgs. 2-9 to 2-10 is a good starting reference on how a command post should operate for a company size unit. Commanders must resource the BOC with personnel, equipment, and sufficient field training to accomplish the mission.

(TA.4.1.3 Maintain Information and Force Status)

TREND 19

SUBJECT: Fire direction center (FDC) battle tracking

OBSERVATION (TF 1): FDC personnel must improve their understanding of the battalion concept of operation, and the task and purpose of subordinate companies in order to properly monitor battalion command and fires net.

DISCUSSION: The FDC is responsible for tracking friendly positions throughout the area of operations as well of situational awareness of ongoing or impending engagements. In the event the tactical operations center (TOC) and tactical administrative center (TAC) become compromised, the mortar platoon becomes the 3rd TOC.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The FDC must monitor battalion command and the fires net. Personnel need to understand the battalion concept of the operation and the task and purpose of each company. They need to be acutely aware of any friendly position forward of the battle area such as scout locations. This can be done by marking friendly positions on a map or using an M16 plotting board. They need to keep a log of significant activities and/or directives from higher. If it is not being pushed to the FDC from higher, the FDC should pull information via frequency-modulated radio from units in regards to their location and disposition. At a minimum, locations should be updated every two hours or sooner based on the mission. The FDC chief or section sergeant establishes a radio watch and ensures personnel are trained on the responsibilities of radio watch.

Example: During a movement to contact the FDC is tracking the front line trace of every maneuver unit and is cognizant when a unit comes in contact of an opposing force.

TREND 20

SUBJECT: Fighting the enemy and not the plan

OBSERVATION (TF 1): Companies frequently fight their own courses of action (COAs), instead of adapting to the current enemy situation while conducting a movement to contact.

> *DISCUSSION:* Often, companies are too involved with their current plan and neglect key enemy indicators on the battlefield that would force them to deviate from their current COA. Companies insist on fighting an obsolete plan and continue implementing a COA that is no longer practical.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Company commanders must do a good intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) of their area of operation and continually refine the plan based on intelligence indicators gathered while conducting the movement to contact. Use the established COA as a base and be prepared to deviate from the current plan to take advantage of enemy indicators. Collect, target, and resource the company mission execution that will facilitate movement to contact where the enemy indicators are.

> **Example:** While clearing a zone during a movement to contact, a company's initial plan is to clear the western edge of the zone based on the enemy template. However, after receiving indirect fire and conducting a crater analysis, the commander learns that the indirect fire is probably coming from the eastern edge of the zone his company is clearing. The commander modifies the plan to clear the eastern side of the zone. His company then finds the enemy mortar and destroys it.

(TA.4.2 Assess Situation)

COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS

Part Two (Trends 21 - 51)

TREND 21

SUBJECT: Casualty evacuation and vehicular recovery

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 EN): Engineer units do not adequately plan for or execute a casualty evacuation or vehicular recovery plan

> *DISCUSSION:* Engineer units generally do a poor job of planning and executing casualty evacuation and recovery/repair of combat damaged vehicles on the battlefield. This has a significant impact upon operations since these vehicles and soldiers are not available to execute either current or future missions. Due to lack of timely and adequate evacuation, numerous casualties die of wounds on the battlefield . Evacuation operations are usually unplanned and conducted with the use of nonstandard evacuation vehicle platforms that sometimes cause further injury to soldiers. Finally, personnel are left untreated on the battlefield because key leaders do not receive reports informing them that casualties are in need of evacuation and medical care.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Leaders should review **CALL Newsletter 89-5** *Commander's Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) System*, **99-6 CTC SCC:** *The Tail Talks*, and **97-2 CSS** in order to obtain specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for planning and executing CASEVAC and vehicle recovery operations. Leaders should review **FM 20-22,** *Vehicle Recovery Operations* in order to review specific vehicle recovery procedures. Finally, all soldiers should review **FM 21-11,** *First Aid For Soldiers* in order to review how to treat various types of casualties. Casualty evacuation should be treated like a battle drill that is planned and rehearsed extensively. The practice and routine use of this battle drill will decrease confusion and increase soldier confidence and aggressiveness on the battlefield.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 22

SUBJECT: Use of the military decision-making process (MDMP)

OBSERVATION (ECHELONS ABOVE DIV): The medical task force is not using the MDMP effectively.

> *DISCUSSION:* The medical task force does not have a clear understanding of the MDMP and the linkage between the steps. They need to apply the process to the all the pre-deployment planning. When they arrive at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) they need to be prepared to execute the plan.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* The MDMP needs to be started early in the process of planning for JRTC. The hospitals need to have a sound

understanding of the MDMP before arriving at JRTC. This will give them a greater understanding of the process and make their MDMP much easier and more effective. Home station training is essential in order to become proficient in the decision-making process. The medical task force must take advantage of the leadership-training program offered at Fort. Polk as well as any command post exercises (CPXs), medical field training exercise, or Golden Medic. Units must know and understand **FM 101-5*, Staff Organization and Operations***, and how the different staff sections participate in the planning process.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 23

SUBJECT: War game

OBSERVATION (BDE MANEUVER): War game sessions are not being conducted in accordance with (IAW) doctrinal standards as outlined in FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*.

DISCUSSION: During the conduct of three military decision-making process (MDMP) sessions for the primary three missions executed -- initial entry/movement to contact (MTC), attack, and defend -- the brigade executive officers routinely do not lead a doctrinally correct war game. Uniformly, inadequate performance of the "basics," such as establishing a timeline to conduct the war game and the use of "action-reaction-counteraction" hampered the staff's ability to focus and conduct the necessary analysis to visualize the flow of the battle. Additionally, failure to utilize the war game worksheet to drive the war game as contained in **FM 101-5**, Chapter 5, page 22, routinely results in inadequate interaction between friendly and enemy players. The war game becomes an exercise on the completion of a "task and purpose" matrix and the brigade staff gains little to no valuable training.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The war game is a disciplined process that attempts to visualize the flow of a battle. It relies heavily on a doctrinal foundation, tactical judgment, and experience. It also focuses the staff's attention on each phase of the operation in a logical sequence, stimulating ideas and providing insights that might not otherwise be discovered. War gaming is a critical step in the MDMP process and should be allocated more time than any other step.

The keys to a good war game are a methodical approach, focus and participation of appropriate staff officers, and interaction between enemy and friendly "forces." The end state of the war game is a staff that has a clear and common vision of how the battle might unfold. Executive officers must establish the conditions for the war game. The staff must first understand the course of action (COA) in detail, critical events to be war-gamed, a tentative time line for each event, and the rules of engagement for conducting the war game. Given this, they can do a preliminary analysis that will enable them to succinctly and accurately discuss their battlefield operating system (BOS)/functional area issues during the war game. The staff will never get to this state of proficiency if they are not trained

individually and collectively before they conduct "the big one."

To be effective staffs must be trained in a crawl, walk, run methodology. The executive officer should look to integrate this training whenever and wherever possible. Until the staff officer/non-commissioned officer (NCO) intimately understands the steps of the MDMP and what standards are expected of him/her, he/she will continuously do less than should be done and will be unprepared to address issues within the MDMP to the desired degree of detail. This is an education problem that can be fixed with continuous, planned garrison training supplemented by computer simulations and culminating in free play field exercises and training center rotations. See **FM 101-5**, pages 5-16 through 5-24 and *Infantry Magazine*, July-August 1996, pages 11-14.

(TA.4.3 Determine Actions)

TREND 24

SUBJECT: Use of estimates

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ENG): Security plans and operations officers (SPOs) are not participating in brigade (BDE) military decision-making process (MDMP) with logistics estimates

DISCUSSION: SPOs are not using operations/logistics (OPLOG) planner (or other sources) to facilitate base logistic estimates for use in BDE MDMP. They must bring a logistics estimate to be a viable participant in the BDE mission analysis and course of action development. Without a solid base for logistical planning, the support battalion becomes reactive instead of anticipatory.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: There are several factors contributing to this dilemma. SPOs are not trained properly prior to assuming that role. They are not familiar with and do not use the materials and tools that can assist them in this endeavor. SPO non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are also not trained to use these same materials. If the NCOs understood what to do and how to do it, the SPO could concentrate on future planning and using all tools at his/her disposal.

(TA.4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 25

SUBJECT: Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR)

OBSERVATION (TF 3): Commanders and staffs are having difficulty determining appropriate CCIR and relating those CCIR to critical decisions.

DISCUSSION: Often brigade commanders develop CCIR that provides useful information, but have little to do with decisions that the commander will have to

make during the operation. The trend is for brigade commanders to develop CCIR that will more often relate to subordinate commanders' decisions rather than the brigade commander's decisions. The result is that the brigade commander becomes focused at the wrong level of detail and decision-making authority becomes blurred.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Brigade commanders should remain focused on CCIR that influence their level of decision-making.

(TA.4.3.1 Issue Planning Guidance)

TREND 26

SUBJECT: Tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP)

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 AV): Aviation task forces normally have a functional TACSOP that is not shared by the slice or attached units.

> *DISCUSSION:* Aviation units deploy to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) as a task force (TF). An assault battalion may be the headquarters but has attack, medical, and heavy lift units attached to them. These task organizations are tailored to meet the mission requirements. The core headquarters will have a functional TACSOP, but the slice or attached units will not have a copy and/or are not incorporated into the headquarters SOPs. This causes problems from the beginning of operations in the intermediate staging base (ISB) and continues throughout the rotation. Major indicators of units operating on a different SOP are the readiness condition levels (REDCON). REDCON 2 indicates 15 minutes before mission execution for lift aircraft but 30 minutes before mission execution for attack aircraft. This is just one example of the many issues that occurs when there is not one standing SOP.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Battalion headquarters when developing their TACSOPs in garrison must include all the slice elements that will make up their TF. The task force headquarters may develop an external SOP. An external SOP can be a smaller document that covers the basics of how the unit will operate as a task force. It can be distributed higher and lower to educate parent headquarters and attached subordinates as to how the TF will prepare, plan, and execute operations. Aviation brigades that have SOPs that cover tactical operations for all types of aviation battalions habitually adapt quicker to fighting as a TF.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 27

SUBJECT: Troop leading procedures

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 EN): Engineer units routinely fail to apply proper troop leading

procedures in order to prepare for a mission

> *DISCUSSION:* Junior officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) do not know or apply proper troop leading procedures (TLPs). Missions are received and warning orders (WARNORD) issued, but the WARNORDs are usually inadequate. Key items missing from the WARNORD include a clearly stated mission, specified sub-unit tasks with a purpose, critical pre-combat checks and inspections (PCCs/PCIs), and a tentative time schedule. Tentative plans are normally inadequate since proper mission analysis to include engineer battlefield assessment (EBA), specified tasks, implied tasks, and facts and assumptions are not delineated and known. Necessary movement is performed adequately. Reconnaissance is normally superficial and only includes one (map) of the four methods available (air, ground, map, combination). Platoon and squad level operation orders (OPORD) are normally only glorified WARNORDs and lack the detailed coordination necessary for an integrated and synchronized combined arms fight. Finally, rehearsals are normally only engineer specific when they are conducted and rarely include a combined arms rehearsal.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Junior officers and NCOs should thoroughly review and understand task #05-3-1018 *Conduct Troop Leading Procedures*, found in **ARTEP 5-145-11-MTP,** *MTP for the Infantry Rifle, Platoon and Squad* and **FM 3-21.8,** *Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, Chapter Two. For guidance on the five types and the six techniques of rehearsals, leaders should refer to **FM 101-5,** *Staff Organization and Operations*, Appendix G and **Call Newsletters 98-5** *Rehearsals* and **91-1** *Rehearsals*. Home station training should include professional development classes on proper TLPs along with an emphasis by the chain of command on the proper execution of TLPs for all missions conducted by all units.

> (TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 28

SUBJECT: Forward support battalion (FSB) operations order (OPORD) and the brigade support area (BSA) occupation/displacement

OBSERVATION (CSS DIV): The FSB S3 is not properly prepared to emplace and displace the BSA.

> *DISCUSSION:* A majority of FSB S3s wait until after they have received the brigade (BDE) OPORD to begin writing the FSBs OPORD, which is comprised largely of information pertaining to the emplacement or displacement of the BSA. Emplacing and displacing the BSA should be a battle drill and the majority of the FSBs OPORD should already be written prior to any mission. One of the key pieces to the OPORD is the BSA movement table, which should be 90 % complete prior to the military decision-making process (MDMP). If a unit is waiting for the FSB OPORD to determine how many vehicles are in the quartering party, they are already behind in planning and executing the emplacement or displacement of their element. The movement table along with other key elements of the tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) should be outlined in every FSB OPORD. Whether they are emplacing or

displacing the BSA, the critical tasks remain the same with each mission, only the conditions change.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: The most significant factor contributing to this problem is the lack of understanding on the part of the FSB S3 that a majority of his OPORD will cover either emplacing or displacing the BSA. The unit must first have a detailed TACSOP covering exactly how they are to occupy. This then must be summarized in an OPORD that pulls out those key areas the S3 wants highlighted. The FSB S3 should begin with an OPORD shell that has this key information and then simply fill in the blanks upon completion of the BDE MDMP and the FSBs parallel planning process. The S3 will need the BDE's Annex I so he can complete the FSB concept of the operation; the composition of the forward logistics element (FLE), if one is being utilized; and those required annexes from the respective staff sections. By ensuring a standardized OPORD is completed prior to any mission, the S3 can significantly reduce the time it takes to publish the FSB OPORD and give subordinate units much needed time.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 29

SUBJECT: Anti-armor engagement area development

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Delta Companies' substandard planning and preparation has led to fighting as individual vehicles and not as platoons.

DISCUSSION: Frequently, Delta Company will be tasked to prepare defensive operations while simultaneously conducting counter reconnaissance operations. This leads to a somewhat ineffective leaders reconnaissance of the battle position (BP)/engagement area (EA); vague guidance to the executive officer (XO); and a subsequent enemy armored penetration, usually right through Delta Company's position. Leaders have to understand that although their screen mission is important and imminent, the defensive leaders recon has to be thorough. Everyone must leave the BP/EA with an exact understanding of what the enemy will most likely do, how the company will fight, and where the enemy should die. Three questions are usually ignored during the reconnaissance:

> (1) Where will the enemy come from? Anti-tank (AT) leaders almost always ignore the propensity of the enemy to use dismounted elements to close with and suppress tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile (TOW) positions prior to the armored spearheads. No one thinks to ask for 1-2 squads to cover dismounted assembly areas (AAs) into the BP.

> (2) Where do I kill them? In semi-wooded terrain, junior leaders wishfully think that enemy armor will stick to wide-open areas. Consequently, TOW positions become irrelevant, and no one plans for 300-400m TOW shots or early warning systems to prepare crews for those snap shots.

> (3) How do I get the enemy into my EA? Obstacle employment

usually never happens for Delta Company BPs as the rifle companies typically have priority. Furthermore, hasty protective obstacles are not used to protect a flank and divert/fix anticipated enemy mounted approaches despite the fact that some units typically carry 2-4 AT mines per TOW vehicle as part of their load plan.

All of these symptoms result in an inability to focus TOW fires in a timely manner while avoiding suppression. Consequently, Delta Company defends as a loose collection of TOW vehicles instead of fighting and focusing fires by platoons.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must use the same basic EA development schemes on the terrain at Fort Polk as they would use at Fort Irwin. Mission, enemy, troops, and time available (METT-T) considerations alter times, trigger lines, and so on, as would be expected, but the principles remain the same. Home station exercises need to be developed to force leaders to plan, prepare, and execute in wooded terrain in order to avoid the commonly observed groupthink "this isn't fair so why try to win?"

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 30

SUBJECT: Alternate command posts

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Whereas battalions normally have established procedures for the main command post (TOC), seldom do they have standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the tactical administrative center (TAC) or assault command post (CP).

DISCUSSION: The lack of standard procedures for the tactical administrative center (TAC) and/or assault CP results in a lack of command and control particularly in the attack phase at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Typically units do not have the right personnel to operate these alternate command posts effectively, and they do not have solid security procedures in place. Additionally, the battalion's leadership usually loses valuable time trying to organize these elements instead of supervising subordinate units.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Units must practice operating both the battalion TAC and dismounted assault CP at home station in order to have effective command and control during the attack phase at JRTC.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 31

SUBJECT: Pre-combat inspections (PCIs)

OBSERVATION (TF 1): Units are not conducting PCIs at the Joint Readiness Training

Center (JRTC).

> *DISCUSSION:* Rotational units do not conduct thorough PCI's prior to deploying for a mission.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Units need to develop a standardized checklist and carve out time prior to deployment that is focused solely on PCI's with all leaders present.

> **Example:** Two hours prior to deployment the unit begins conducting PCIs and the immediate supervisor uses a laminated checklist to check off each item with a marker.

> (TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 32

SUBJECT: Company and platoon tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs)

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Ninety percent of the companies and platoons that come to JRTC do not have any written SOPs for routine tactical tasks and activities.

> *DISCUSSION:* Most units that come to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) do not have a standing TACSOP and leaders usually plan to develop one once they return to home station. As a result, units spend too much time and effort trying to accomplish routine tasks that should be simple. The problem only becomes worse once the units begin to sustain casualties and the personnel who have to step up do not have an SOP to assist them.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* At a minimum, units should have a draft TACSOP that covers how the unit accomplishes routine activities and tasks prior to arriving at JRTC. This will increase the unit's entry training level and allow it to get the maximum benefit from the JRTC rotation.

> (TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 33

SUBJECT: Troop leading procedures (TLPs)

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Military police (MP) platoon leadership fails to properly execute TLPs.

> *DISCUSSION:* MP platoon leaders do not issue timely warning, fragmentary, and operations orders to subordinate leaders. Orders that are given often lack sufficient detail for successful execution. This generally occurs as a result of poor time management. Coming out of a planning session with the brigade. platoon

leaders find themselves in a crunch for time This, coupled with the lack of confirmation briefs, back briefs, and other forms of rehearsals, usually result in subordinate elements lacking an understanding of situational awareness, the mission, and the commander's intent.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: MP leaders at all levels must execute troop leading procedures. At a minimum, platoon orders should provide subordinate units with a clear picture of the enemy and friendly situation, the commander's intent, and a clearly defined task with an easily understood and valid purpose. Once the mission is received and the orders are given, it is the leader's responsibility to conduct rehearsals and provide supervision that will ensure that every soldier has a complete understanding of the plan.

Example: The platoon leader participates in the brigade's mission analysis and mission analysis briefing. Once he/she receives the commander's guidance for planning the course of action (COA), a warning order is issued to the platoon. While the platoon leader is conducting COA development, the platoon sergeant and squad leaders are starting the necessary movement and conducting parallel planning. After the COA development is completed, the platoon leader issues any additional guidance to the platoon (reconnaissance, terrain model, and so on) and drafts his initial plan during the war game. Squad leaders continue to conduct parallel planning with supervision from the platoon sergeant. Once the brigade issues the operations order (OPORD), the platoon leader quickly completes the plan, making any necessary last minute changes required and then issues the OPORD to his subordinate leaders. The platoon leader's efficiency has allowed for sufficient time for back briefs, rehearsals, and pre-combat inspections/pre-combat checks.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 34

SUBJECT: Command post (CP) operations.

OBSERVATION (ECHELONS ABOVE DIV): Company headquarters are not proficient in establishing and operating a CP in a tactical environment.

DISCUSSION: Units either do not have a tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) or have one that has not been validated and/or disseminated to the lowest user level. There is no standardization in the tracking charts used for their appropriate commodities and critical combat service support (CSS) equipment. The individual sections track their commodities using charts that they have developed, the company is using charts that they have developed, and the support operations in turn have different charts where they record the data. Units are also challenged in maintaining asset visibility, battle tracking, and communications with higher and lower.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Companies must develop and disseminate a TACSOP prior to deployment and validate and/or improve it in the field. The TACSOP should include standardized charts and status reports that are used at both the company and battalion level. Units also need to develop a tracking

system for their critical CSS equipment.

(TA.4.4 Direct and Lead Subordinate Forces)

TREND 35

SUBJECT: Rehearsals

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 AV): Rehearsals are not being conducted

DISCUSSION: Units do not use the time available at the intermediate staging base (ISB) to conduct proper, thorough rehearsals. As the BSA chief-of-staff, the executive officer (XO) must ensure the unit is integrating tenants by ensuring they understand the forward supply battalion (FSB) tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP) and by conducting brigade support area (BSA) occupation rehearsals, quartering party rehearsals, and tactical convoy rehearsals. The FSB staff waits for information from brigade (BDE) in order to conduct the military decision-making process (MDMP) and the soldiers wait to be told what to do.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: FSBs need to develop a plan prior to arriving at the ISB to facilitate rehearsals and tenant integration. They must analyze the time required for each type of rehearsal and ensure all key personnel attend. Since this is a battalion function, the XO has to enforce this or it will not be done. Without thorough rehearsals, the soldiers will not truly understand their roles during each phase of the operation. The rehearsals should be conducted during both daylight and hours of darkness.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 36

SUBJECT: Company/troop rehearsals

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 AV): Company rehearsals are not conducted.

DISCUSSION: Troop/company level and below rehearsals are rarely executed. Sometimes map rehearsals are conducted. When rehearsals are executed they are rarely done to standard even when planning time is available.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Companies must conduct company and team rehearsals before every operation. The type and time spent on the rehearsal is situation and time dependent. If mission timelines do not include company rehearsals they will not be executed.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 37

SUBJECT: Troop leading procedures (TLPs)

OBSERVATION (LF DIV): Troop leading procedures continue to hamper operations at the platoon and company level. The most noticeable problems are in the areas of planning and mission analysis, pre-combat inspections (PCIs)/pre-combat checks (PCCs), and time management.

> *DISCUSSION:* Leaders at all levels need to work harder on understanding and implementing troop-leading procedures for every mission. Every leader has a role in the TLP process and must fulfill their responsibility to the chain of command. Pre-combat inspections, pre-combat checks, and other tasks require direct NCO supervision and tend to be overlooked by squad leaders and vehicle commanders. Units tend to refer to home station training when planning for and executing missions without conducting any mission analysis, orders process, rehearsals, or prep for combat. This is most apparent when a unit is tasked to accomplish a simple battle drill as part of a larger mission (for example when a unit is tasked to conduct a breach in stride as part of a tactical road march). The lack of troop leading procedures and coordination results in the company only being prepared half the time for mission.
>
> Platoon leaders/sergeants are unfamiliar with the mission analysis process, specifically the ability to receive an operation order and identify the implied and essential tasks for their specific unit. A trend is for the platoon leader to issue a mission statement that is a regurgitation of the company mission statement that does not address specific tasks assigned to the platoon.
>
> Time management continues to be an area of weakness at platoon and company level. Leaders at all levels fail to manage their most critical resource effectively. The inability to master available time leads to poor planning, little or no mission preparation, and poor execution. Some areas requiring improvement or special emphasis in time management are assembly area operations, priorities of work, rehearsals, and the establishment of timelines at platoon and company level.
>
> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Rotational units need to develop effective standing operating procedures (SOPs) that include comprehensive PCIs/PCCs that are conducted at home station prior to coming to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Better planning, especially in the area of mission analysis, will lead to more effective execution.
>
> (TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 38

SUBJECT: Pre combat checks/pre combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs)

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Military police (MP) platoons are not conducting PCCs and

PCIs effectively.

>*DISCUSSION:* Most MP platoons come to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) with adequate PCC and PCI checklists; however, soldiers are not using them because the leaders do not supervise their use. As a result, MP often become casualties on the battlefield because their protective gear is buried in rucksacks after the posture has been raised in the brigade or the platoon is maintaining all of its AT-4s in the headquarters trailer.

>*TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* PCCs and PCIs are available for reference in **FM 19-4,** *Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, and Enemy Prisoner of War Operations*, and **FM 7-8,** *Rifle Platoon and Squad*. Most platoons tailor these to fit their mission requirements. PCCs/PCIs need to be incorporated as part of the troop leading procedures (TLPs). Leaders at all levels must discipline themselves too physically conduct PCCs/PCIs and not simply settle for a verbal confirmation. Checklists need to be suitable, feasible. Well-established priorities of work, coupled with sound load plans will assist in effective use of time.

>*Example:* The squad leader understands that during his upcoming mission, the potential for encountering a minefield is high. As part of his PCC/PCIs he has a squad member assemble and test the mine detector.

>>(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans or Orders)

TREND 39

SUBJECT: Lack of unit rehearsals

OBSERVATION (TF 1): Units do not consistently rehearse for an upcoming mission after issuing an operations order.

>*DISCUSSION:* Thorough rehearsals continue to hamper unit performance at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Consistently, rehearsals are not conducted to standard and normally end up being a back brief to the commander that detracts from the rehearsal. Leaders are routinely unfamiliar with the current operations. Rehearsals turn into a condensed operations order (OPORD) from the commander and platoon leaders. Rehearsals are the finishing touch on operation planning. They allow the unit to practice the details of the operation that vary from the units standing operating procedures (SOP). Additionally, most units do not comprehend the methods and types of rehearsals and what is needed for each mission. Rehearsals can include rock drills to full-scale operations. It is understandable that time constraints will influence the type and intensity of rehearsals. Additionally, units fail to rehearse contingencies during their rehearsals. Units focus on the primary mission and fail to account for all possible contingencies. Although time constraints will impact troop-leading procedures, no one step should be omitted. It is possible for a unit to amend the process timeline by changing the type and scope of rehearsal conducted

>*TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Units must allocate time to conduct some type of rehearsal whether it is a full scale, walk-through, or use of a rock drill/sand table. At a minimum a brief back should include each element's task

and purpose with contingencies identified.

Example: Platoon leader puts out time for a rehearsal for key leaders or the entire platoon. The platoon leader rehearses each phase of the operation from start point, through movement, to actions on the objective.

(TA.4.4.1.1 Develop and Complete Plans and Orders)

TREND 40

SUBJECT: Time management during movement to contact (MTC) phase

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Units fail to maximize the daylight hours for maneuvering/ clearing zones.

DISCUSSION: Failure to establish a battle rhythm results in daylight hours being wasted on activities such as re-supply and movement to assigned zones that could be conducted at night . With a maximum of a 12-hour daylight window, companies are limited on their time to "find" the enemy.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Battalion and company commanders must adhere to a battle rhythm that allows 2/3 of their elements a minimum of 10 hours of daylight clearance operations. Other required activities can be accomplished at night when enemy contact is less likely. Company commanders should identify and task a security element early in their planning and incorporate this into their battle rhythm recognizing that they will need to travel back and forth to the battalion tactical operations center (TOC).

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 41

SUBJECT: Civilians on the battlefield

OBSERVATION (ECHELONS ABOVE DIV): The medical task force rarely provides treatment to the civilians on the battlefield regardless of injuries or illnesses. This frequently leads to a sense of frustration and lack of trust of the military by the local population.

DISCUSSION: The rules of engagement are part of the corps support command (COSCOM) operation plan and the operation order found in Annex E (Rules of Engagement). The hospital must be proactive in assuring that all member of the medical task force are familiar with these rules and understand how they are to be applied.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: All soldiers coming to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) must be familiar with Annex E. It is essential that the hospital commander and his/her staff assure themselves that all their soldiers are

familiar with the rules of engagement (ROE) and how they apply to the medical treatment of civilians. The sergeant of the guard is instrumental in assuring that the guards on the gates know Annex E and are comfortable dealing with the civilians on the battlefield.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 42

SUBJECT: Time management in the defense

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Units consistently lose preparation time in the defense through poor time management.

> *DISCUSSION:* Units fail to take advantage of every possible minute to prepare for the defense. Most units lose time getting into their sector. There are a myriad of reasons for this problem from the failure of battalion to assign sectors to subordinate units to units waiting for trucks to move them into sector instead of walking. However, unit leadership needs to stress getting into sector and then clearing and conducting reconnaissance. Once in sector, time management problems stem from the lack of defensive planning standing operating procedures (SOPs), slow military decision-making process (MDMP), and poor parallel planning. The normally slow distribution of Class IV (barrier material) does cause delays in preparation; however, most incidents of slow delivery of Class IV were the result of slow maneuver planning or the fact that the unit was not prepared to receive the materials.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Two improvements in defensive planning could save time. Empower junior leaders to get into sector. Infantry units need to march if trucks are not available. Also, units need to issue a series of warning orders that allow their subordinate units to begin preparation. Develop a defensive planning SOP that, at a minimum, should include priorities of work (in a 24-hour format) and a leaders reconnaissance SOP that addresses composition and tasks to be performed.

(TA.4.4.4 Maintain Unit Discipline)

TREND 43

SUBJECT: Air-ground integration

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 AVN): Air-ground integration continues to challenge aviation units.

> *DISCUSSION:* There is not enough coordination between air and ground units during the planning process. Rarely do aircrews have a true understanding of the ground unit scheme of maneuver or lower level maneuver graphics. This reduces the effectiveness of aircrews in their direct support of the ground fight and

increases the risk of fratricide. Aircrews and ground personnel do not have effective standing operating procedures (SOPs) and training in close combat attacks. Aircrews and ground personnel do not have a reasonable understanding of communication procedures and friendly and target marking procedures.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Air-ground integration starts with the brigade combat team's (BCTs) military decision-making process (MDMP) by ensuring that the use of aviation with clear tasks and purposes and command relationships throughout every phase of the operation is considered. Commanders must nest the use of aviation with their ground tactical plan. Close coordination through the planning process, rehearsals, and during execution must be maintained. During execution, aviation assets should be talking on command nets with leaders who own the ground. Air-ground training must be emphasized more at home station.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 44

SUBJECT: Staff integration of the civil affairs (CA) team leader

OBSERVATION (ECHELONS ABOVE DIV): There is poor integration of the civil affairs (CA) team A (CAT-A) leader into the corps support group (CSG)/corps support battalion (CSB) staff. CAT-A leaders are not developing a CA annex with overlay.

DISCUSSION: Commanders continue to be challenged integrating CAT-A leaders into their staff due in large part to the CSG/CSB commanders' lack of experience, training, and knowledge of CA doctrine, the CA role, and civil-military operations. The CAT-A leaders are routinely inactive participants during staff planning sessions or conduct CA planning in a vacuum. As a result, the staff and the commander are not aware of the capabilities and limitations of the CAT-A and the CAT-A is not effectively employed as a force multiplier. The majority of the CA missions are last minute "911" operations that are usually unplanned with little or no time for troop leading procedures (TLPs). The CAT-A leader is the principal staff officer to the commander in all matters concerning the political, social, cultural, and economic aspects of military operations. He acts as a liaison between the military forces, civil authorities, and the people in the area of operations (AO). CA units are a force multiplier that provides unique capabilities to operational commanders in support of joint, combined, and interagency operations in both war and operations other than war environments.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The CAT-A Leader must get 'face time' with the commander and staff to articulate the CA mission. The discussion should encompass CAT-A capabilities and limitations, to include the best way to employ the CAT-A assets to support the commander's intent and operation.

2. Commanders and staffs must possess a working knowledge of CA doctrine, capabilities, and their role in the process. **FM 41-10,** *Civil Affairs Operations* describes CA functions, capabilities, and organization, the roles/responsibilities

of CA, and the employment of CA assets.

3. **GTA 41-01-001/** *Civil Affairs Information Planning Guide* is a mission planning overview that uses the battlefield operating systems (BOS) as a checklist in mission planning and insures the planners consider the CA aspects of the BOS.

4. The CAT-A and team leader must earn a certain amount of credibility with the commander and key staff members and develop a CA annex and overlay.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 45

SUBJECT: Aviation integration into the brigade combat team (BCT)

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 AVN): Aviation liaison officers (LNOs) are used as "runners" instead of planners who are integrated into the military decision-making process (MDMP) cycle of the BCT.

DISCUSSION:

1. The task force commander is the primary LNO for his/her unit. The aviation task force commander must have a close and consistent relationship with the BCT. The commander will either empower or restrict the operations of his/her LNOs.

2. Too often LNOs are not properly equipped and/or manned to conduct continuous planning with the BCT. The LNOs are not manned for 24-hour operations. Improper rest cycles will eventually bring the LNO's efficiency down during the course of rotation. LNOs are too often improperly equipped with vehicles and communication equipment.

3. Aviation LNOs do not participate in the BCTs MDMP as a member of the battle staff. Aviation becomes an afterthought versus an integrated portion of the plan.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:

1. The commander must select a LNO team and empower that cell to operate as planners. This allows aviation to be incorporated early into the BCTs plan. Aviation task force commanders must, at every opportunity, get involved in the planning cycle of the BCT. Units that have strong LNO cells and commanders that closely monitor the MDMP cycle of the BCT greatly improve the understanding, use, and integration of aviation assets.

2. The LNO should be thought of as a cell instead of as an individual. This cell must be capable of 24-hour operations that allow battle tracking and planning. The LNO cell must be able to give an accurate account of the aviation task force and must be capable of planning future aviation missions. The LNO cell has to be able to communicate back to its parent unit and also have the ability to monitor

command and operational nets. The LNO cell may consist of 1 to 2 vehicles, 2 single channel ground airborne radio systems (SINCGARS), 2 OE254 antennaes, DNVT, 2 officers, and 2 enlisted personnel. The officers primarily focus on planning future missions. The enlisted soldiers primarily focus on battle track of on-going missions and updating the BCT's picture of the aviation task force's capabilities.

3. Aviation LNOs have to be considered a part of the BCT's battle staff. The LNOs must facilitate the BCT's MDMP. Successful LNOs present the aviation task force's capabilities and limitations during mission analysis, integrate the aviation commander's intent, ensure supportability of the BCT courses of action (COA), posses the ability to fight aviation in COA analysis, articulate advantages and disadvantages during comparison, and ensure aviation has a clear task and purpose in the BCT's order. To accomplish this the LNO cell must be integrated and considered a part of the BCT's battle staff.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 46

SUBJECT: Setting conditions for the deliberate attack during military operations in urban terrain (MOUT)

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Units are conducting attacks hastily on Shughart-Gordon at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).

DISCUSSION: Companies and platoons are routinely conducting their attacks without ensuring the conditions are set for success. The piecemeal effect of these attacks enable the opposing forces (OPFOR) to focus their efforts and separate the blue forces (BLUFOR). The result of these desynchronized attacks is that BLUFOR is seldom able to get a significant force inside the city to defeat the OPFOR. Battalion level leaders routinely attempt to force their units to adhere to an attack schedule as opposed to basing their attack on conditions being set (when the enemies' disposition and composition is best suited for the BLUFORs overwhelming success).

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Tactical patience is critical when conducting a deliberate attack in built-up terrain. A checklist must be established for all conditions that a commander considers necessary for success. This checklist/operational schedule (OPSKED) must be understood and adhered to by the subordinate commanders.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 47

SUBJECT: Failure to integrate indirect fires

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Leaders rarely integrate indirect fires while in contact to support maneuver.

> *DISCUSSION:* During movement, units that make contact have not been able to bring their organic and supporting indirect fires into the fight. Typically units fail to plan indirect fires. Once in contact, units do not incorporate indirect fires because either they do not know the locations of subordinate and adjacent units, or they have failed to plan targets based on a thorough estimate of the situation. The result is that units are unable to get timely and accurate indirect fires.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* Units must plan and rehearse fires to support movement, particularly in the low intensity conflict (LIC) phase. Additionally, leaders must track adjacent and subordinate units to ensure timely and safe indirect fires during contact.

> (TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 48

SUBJECT: Staff integration

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 MP): Military police (MP) platoon leaders experience difficulty with integration in the brigade staff.

> *DISCUSSION:* MP platoon leaders continue to be challenged with staff integration due in a large part to the MP platoon leaders' lack of experience, training, and knowledge of their role as the brigade provost marshal, a special staff officer. MP platoon leaders do not clearly understand the military decision-making process (MDMP). They routinely are inactive participants during brigade planning sessions and continuously battle between balancing their time between platoon leader duties and their responsibilities as a provost marshal. This normally results in the platoon leader failing to articulate to the commander and staff the best way to employ MP assets to support the brigade's operation. Therefore most missions conducted by the MPs are last minute "911" operations that are usually unplanned with little or no time for troop leading procedures (TLPs).

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* MP platoon leaders must possess a working knowledge of the MDMP and their role in it. They should review the roles/responsibilities of the provost marshal as identified in **FM 19-1,** *Military Police Support for the Airland Battle* and have a strong foundation of doctrinal knowledge in order to advise the commander on the employment of MP forces. Most importantly, MP platoon leaders must earn a certain amount of credibility with the commander and key staff members. This is no easy task and often requires a great deal of time to accomplish. Naturally, platoon leaders cannot spend all of their time at the brigade tactical operations center (TOC). Determining critical times/events within the brigade staff's battle rhythm will assist the platoon leader in balancing efforts.

> **Examples:**

1. The brigade staff receives the division OPORD and initiates it planning process. The platoon leader knows that he/she will be tied-up at the brigade TOC for the next 18 hours. The platoon sergeant sends a runner to see the platoon leader every 4 hours to receive updated information in order to assist the squad leaders with parallel planning and time available for troop leading procedures (TLPs).

2. The platoon leader recognizes from experience that the key events during the MDMP are the mission analysis, course of action (COA) development, operations order (OPORD) preparation, and the issuance of the OPORD. Since there is normally little if any input required during the COA analysis (war game), platoon leaders can make arrangements with the staff to use that time to initiate TLPs within the platoon.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 49

SUBJECT: Use of mortars during search and attack

OBSERVATION (TF 2): Units consistently fail to incorporate mortars during search and attack.

> *DISCUSSION:* During the low intensity conflict (LIC)/movement to contact (MTC) phase of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), units fail to integrate mortars into their plan for fixing the enemy once they make contact. Often the enemy elements are within close proximity to friendly forces. Too often the blue force's (BLUFOR) unit leader, along with the forward observer/fire support officer does not believe that indirect fire is quick enough to contribute to the fight. This assumption results in a continued disregard for the most responsive fires available to the maneuver unit. Leaders fail to understand the importance of sealing off escape routes and detering reinforcing elements from coming into the fight.

> *TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES:* FO/FSO must force their counterpart to utilize fires. The platoon leader and commander will always be in a hurry to go on the attack immediately without implementing all elements of firepower.

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 50

SUBJECT: Daily military decision-making process (MDMP)/battle rhythm needs to be executed during stability and support operations (SASO)

OBSERVATION (TF 3): Battalion staff did not establish a daily battle rhythm.

> *DISCUSSION:* Most battalion staffs execute a daily synchronization meeting to

coordinate the following operations 12-24 hours out during combat rotations. During the most recent mission rehearsal exercise (MRE), the battalion staff did not use existing procedures and techniques to synchronize and integrate operations.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: There are pre-existing techniques and procedures for executing targeting meetings, only the method of engagement should change. Using the **CALL Newsletter 97-8**, Appendix A, *Targeting Meeting Agenda* as an example, very little changes from how staff currently execute. Targets are leaders, communities, and/or ethnic groups, not weapons systems. Detection may require reading graffiti or watching local media or watching and listening to children. Delivery assets could be civil affairs (CA)/psychological operations (PSYOP), friendly local leaders, local media, a non-governmental organization (NGO)/international organization (IO), a rifle platoon in a show of force, or the battalion commander doing a face-to-face (FTF) meeting. Targets are not attacked but engaged.

V. Agenda:

Executive officer (XO): Focus of targeting/synchronization meeting.

S2:

- Current SITTEMP (visual display, including actions of local leaders and ethnic groups)
- Status of R&S plan
- Assessment of engaged targets
- Status of collection/detection assets available
- Probable courses of action (COA)/high value targets (HVTs)

S3:

- Changes to commander's intent
- Requirements from higher headquarters
- Review of current operations/status of essential elements of friendly information (EEFI)/friendly forces information requirements (FFIR)
- Task organization
- Future operations

Fire support officer (FSO)/forward observer (FO): Status of delivery assets available

Commander (CDR)/XO/S3: Approves priority intelligence requirements (PIR), and the high priority target (HPT) list

ALL: XO leads battlefield operating system (BOS) cross-walk through new target synchronization matrix (TSM). Detect, deliver, and assess

VI. Products Produced:

S2:

- Updated PIR
- Updated reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan

FSO: Updated target list

S3:

- Target synchronization matrix (TSM)
- Tasking/fragmentation orders (FRAGOs) to subordinate units (includes S2 and FSO products as annexes)

VII. Disseminate products to subordinate units.

EXAMPLE TARGETING SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

	DECIDE			DETECT	DELIVER	DESIRED TARGET EFFECTS	ASSESS
SEQ NO.	TARGET DESCRIPTION	NAI	GRID	COLLECTOR/ ASSET/UNIT	ASSET/ UNIT		COLLECTION
PRIORITY: P=LOW PRIORITY, FILE FOR FUTURE USE A=AS ACQUIRED I=IMMEDIATE	LEGEND: KC=KEY COMMUNICATOR CO=CRIMINAL ORGANIZER PL=POLITICAL LEADER CL=COMMUNITY/CIVIC LEADER P=POPULATION					D=DESTROY N=NEUTRALIZE S=SUPPRESS I=INFLUENCE R=REINFORCE	FRAGO NO: _____ OPS LOG: _____

(TA.4.4.5 Synchronize Tactical Operations)

TREND 51

SUBJECT: Utilization of the electronic warfare (EW) section sergeant

OBSERVATION (BDE C2 ADA): The sentinel section sergeant is not integrated into the battery tactical operation center (TOC) operations.

> *DISCUSSION:* The sentinel section sergeant's role in the battery TOC is undefined. He must be integrated into current and future operations planning. Tactical updates are not passed down to teams, resulting in a lack of situational

awareness by the sentinel teams. Sentinel teams have difficulty in maintaining a consistent battle rhythm of reporting their status to the sentinel section sergeant (classes of upply, maintenance status, broadcast status, and so on). The sentinel section sergeant needs this information to accurately report to the battery commander digital connectivity and support issues that insure a constant digital EW means for the supported unit. The sentinel section sergeant must have the primary role in the sensor management plan development and coordinate security, engineer support, and route clearance for movement for his teams.

TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES: Integrate sentinel sections into the battery at least two weeks prior to deployment. The deploying section reviews and attains proficiency with the battery tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOP), administrative standing operating procedures (SOPs), and all applicable reports. The sentinel section sergeants' responsibilities in the TOC are clearly defined. These responsibilities include conducting pattern analysis, terrain analysis, site selection, and coordination with supported units and engineer assets prior to sentinel team deployment. The sentinel section sergeant participates in operational planning 48-72 hours out. He monitors the status of all teams on an internal sentinel section net and reports the status to the battery commander or executive officer (XO) on the battery command net. The sentinel section sergeant utilizes the battery TOC as his base of operations while maintaining his ability to move to the sensor team's location and the brigade support area (BSA)/rear tactical operations center (RTOC) to coordinate for classes of supply, replacements, maintenance, and logistics packages (LOGPACs). Refer to **FM 44-48, *Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Sensor Platoon***, Appendices A-H.

(TA.4.5 Employ Tactical Command and Control)